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ABSTRACT 
The year 2018 has witnessed widespread celebrations of the life and 
legacy of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., who was assassinated fifty years 
ago in Memphis, Tennessee. Yet if Dr. King were alive today, he would 
no doubt be dismayed by the path taken by the Supreme Court’s 
treatment of race-related issues in recent years. Not only has the Court 
abandoned the quest for school desegregation, but the 2013 decision in 
Shelby County v. Holder substantially reduced the effectiveness of the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965, which was the most important legislative 
monument to Dr. King’s efforts. 
By contrast, these developments would no doubt have pleased 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr., a harsh critic of Dr. King who joined the Supreme 
Court less than four years after King’s death. Prior to taking his seat on 
the Court, Powell had been openly critical of the decision in Brown v. 
Board of Education, and in his capacity as chair of the school board of 
Richmond, Virginia, had worked ceaselessly to limit the pace and scope 
of the desegregation of the Richmond schools. Moreover, even before 
joining the Court, he had actively sought to limit the impact of the 
Voting Rights Act on the decision-making authority of state and local 
governments in the South. Similarly, in the cases that came before him 
after coming to the Court, Powell consistently voted to limit the scope 
of remedial orders in desegregation cases and argued that the 
Constitution imposed important limits on the scope of congressional 
authority to deal with the issues that the Voting Rights Act was designed 
to address. 
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Powell had only limited success in persuading a majority of his 
colleagues to support him on these issues. However, the reasoning of the 
Court’s decisions in the years after Powell left the Court in 1987 has 
often embraced the arguments made by Powell during his tenure as a 
justice. This article not only explores Powell’s background and 
jurisprudence, but also provides the first scholarly discussion of the 
relationship between his views and the positions currently taken by the 
Court. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court’s attitude toward issues involving school 
desegregation and voting rights has changed significantly in recent 
years. During the period between the mid-1960s and the early 1990s, a 
majority of the justices embraced two principles in dealing with such 
issues. First, although not as aggressive as many progressives would 
have preferred, the Court itself was actively involved in promoting 
racial balance in public schools in both the North and the South.1 
 
 1.  See, e.g., Columbus Bd. Of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); Swann v. Charlotte-
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Second, the justices were willing to countenance even more aggressive 
actions by the federal government that were designed to ensure that 
African-Americans in particular were treated fairly by state 
governments.2 
One of the early signs of a change in the Court’s approach to 
these issues came with the 1991 decision in Board of Education of 
Oklahoma City v. Dowell,3 where the justices signaled their retreat 
from involvement in the process of school desegregation. More than 
two decades later, in Shelby County v. Holder,4 the Court took even 
more dramatic action, effectively invalidating the preclearance 
provision of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which had been designed 
to ensure that changes in state voting and election laws would not 
undermine the ability of African-Americans to participate fully in 
electoral politics. In both cases, the Court took the position that the 
conditions that once justified such aggressive measures had largely 
disappeared. 
While both Dowell and Shelby County have been the subject of 
extensive academic commentary, scholars have not focused on the 
relationship between the perspective on race relations that underlay 
those decisions and that which informed the jurisprudence of Justice 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr., who served on the Court from 1972 through 1987. 
Powell was a pillar of the white establishment in Richmond, Virginia, 
and was the chair of the city school board during the period 
immediately following the decision in Brown v. Board of Education.5 
Although he opposed the doctrine of massive resistance, Powell was 
openly critical of the Brown decision and consistently sought to limit 
the impact of the decision on the racial composition of the Richmond 
schools. In addition, he objected to the use of the preclearance 
requirement of the Voting Rights Act to prevent the implementation 
of a measure that was clearly designed to perpetuate white control of 
the Richmond City Council. 
By the time that Powell joined the Court, he had apparently 
become reconciled to the basic principles embodied in Brown. 
Nonetheless, he continued to oppose both the use of aggressive 
 
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
 2.  See, e.g., City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980); S.C. v. Katzenbach, 383 
U.S. 301 (1966). 
 3.  498 U.S. 237 (1991). 
 4.  570 U.S. 529 (2013). 
 5.  347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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measures designed to improve the racial balance of previously 
segregated schools and the imposition of the preclearance 
requirement on the South. More generally, Powell’s treatment of the 
race-related issues that came before the Court during his tenure as a 
justice emphasized his conviction that systemic racial discrimination 
was largely a thing of the past, and that any lingering vestiges of 
racism could generally be addressed adequately without disrupting 
the existing structure of governmental institutions. Powell was unable 
to convince a majority of his colleagues on the Burger Court to follow 
his lead in cases dealing with school desegregation and voting rights. 
By contrast, as this article demonstrates, the arguments that Powell 
made in those cases were the precursors of the analysis that would 
later underlie the positions taken by the Court in cases such as Dowell 
and Shelby County. 
I. THE MAKING OF A SOUTHERN GENTLEMAN6 
Lewis Franklin Powell, Jr. was born in Suffolk, Virginia on 
September 19, 1907. After spending several years in the Richmond 
public school system, Powell attended McGuire’s University School, a 
private, college preparatory high school which generally sought to 
send its graduates to the University of Virginia. However, hoping for 
an opportunity to play intercollegiate baseball, Powell chose instead 
to attend Washington and Lee College, a segregated, all-male 
institution that was deeply steeped in the traditions of the Old South. 
Although Powell was unable to earn a place on the college 
baseball team, he achieved great success in a wide variety of other 
endeavors while at Washington and Lee. In addition to graduating 
magna cum laude with a degree in business and being elected to Phi 
Beta Kappa, he became the president of both his fraternity and the 
student body as a whole, was managing editor of the school 
newspaper, worked on the staff of the yearbook, and helped produce 
campus balls. In recognition of his accomplishments, Powell received 
the Algernon Sidney Sullivan Medallion, which was awarded to the 
student “who excels in high ideals of living, in spiritual qualities, and 
in genuine and disinterested service to others.”7 
 
 6.  The description of Powell’s early life and education is taken from JOHN C. JEFFRIES, 
JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. (1994).  
 7.  Id. at 26–31. 
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From the time that he entered college, believing that “soldiers and 
lawyers made most of the history,”8 Powell’s goal was to attend law 
school. By beginning to take law courses as an undergraduate, Powell 
was able to finish both his undergraduate and law school courses at 
Washington and Lee in six years, graduating first in his law school 
class in June, 1931. At the insistence of his father, Powell then spent a 
post-graduate year at Harvard Law School, receiving an LL.M. degree 
in 1932.9 
Following his year at Harvard, Powell was offered a position as an 
associate at the Wall Street law firm of Davis Polk and Wardwell. 
However, he chose instead to return to Richmond. After practicing 
for three years with a small firm, Powell accepted a position as an 
associate at Hunton, Williams, Anderson, Gay and Moore, [hereinafter 
Hunton, Williams] the preeminent law firm in the city,10 and remained 
with that firm until he joined the Supreme Court in 1972. 
In addition to his private practice, Powell immersed himself in the 
civic life of the city of Richmond and the state of Virginia. Believing 
that pro bono work was “a duty of citizenship that should be 
undertaken quite apart from the possibility of establishing broader 
personal recognition” and also had the “positive by-product” of 
enhancing the standing of a young lawyer in the community,11 Powell 
became well known for providing free legal services to a wide variety 
of charitable organizations. In addition, Powell took a strong interest 
in political and governmental affairs. In 1947, he was elected to the 
commission that rewrote the city charter. Three years later, Powell 
was chosen to serve on the Richmond School Board. In 1961, he was 
appointed to the state Board of Education and in 1968 became a 
member of the Commission on Constitutional Revision that was 
charged with the task of revising the state constitution.12 
II. RACIAL ATTITUDES 
A. Overview 
Powell came of age at a time when Virginia society, like that of the 
other states in the South, was rigidly segregated by race. The policy of 
 
 8.  Id. at 30. 
 9.  Id. at 37–39. 
 10.  Id. at 44–46. 
 11.  Id. at 123–24. 
 12.  Id. 
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segregation was embodied in the Jim Crow laws that required the 
separation of whites and African-Americans on railroads and in 
public schools and places of amusement. Moreover, during the early 
twentieth century, political power in the Southern states rested 
entirely with the white population. Although formally prohibited by 
the Fifteenth Amendment from using race as a qualification for 
voting, Virginia and the other Southern states used a wide variety of 
formal and informal measures to prevent or discourage African-
Americans from participating in the political process. As a result, in 
1940, fewer than five percent of the voting age African-Americans in 
the South were registered to vote.13 
The maintenance of racial segregation met little resistance from 
federal authorities in the early twentieth century. However, beginning 
in the 1940s, segregation came under increasing attack from several 
different quarters. During that period, the Supreme Court became 
more receptive to constitutional attacks on racial classifications.14 
Even more importantly, the opponents of the Jim Crow system began 
to gain traction within the political branches of the federal 
government. 
A speech made by President Harry S. Truman on February 2, 1948, 
reflected the growing opposition to the practice of racial segregation 
that pervaded Southern society. The speech was a response to a report 
that had been issued by a Committee on Civil Rights which had been 
created by Truman on December 5, 1946. The Committee’s mandate 
was to “make recommendations with respect to the adoption or 
establishment, by legislation or otherwise, of more adequate and 
effective means and procedures for the protection of the civil rights of 
the people of the United States.” In his speech, Truman called for, 
among other things: the establishment of a permanent Commission on 
Civil Rights, a Joint Congressional Committee on Civil Rights, and a 
Civil Rights Division in the Department of Justice; the strengthening 
of existing civil rights statutes; the passage of statutes specifically 
aimed at providing federal protection against lynching and protecting 
the right to vote from discriminatory action by public officials based 
on race, color or “other unreasonable classification”; the 
establishment of a Fair Employment Practice Commission to prevent 
 
 13.  Kraig Beyerlein and Kenneth T. Andrews, Black Voting During the Civil Rights 
Movement: A Micro-Level Analysis, 87 SOCIAL FORCES 1, 4 (2008). 
 14.  See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (prohibiting enforcement of racially-
restrictive covenants); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (outlawing white primaries). 
MALTZ_MACROS (DO NOT DELETE) 5/15/2019  10:28 PM 
2019] THE TRIUMPH OF THE SOUTHERN MAN 175 
unfair discrimination in employment; and a prohibition on racial 
discrimination in interstate transportation facilities.15 Five months 
later, sounding a similar note, the Democratic National Convention 
adopted a platform that praised Truman for his stand on civil rights 
and called for passage of federal legislation that would guarantee “(1) 
the right of full and equal political participation; (2) the right to equal 
opportunity of employment; (3) the right of security of person; (4) 
and the right of equal treatment in the service and defense of our 
nation.”16 
Truman’s speech was condemned by the representatives of the 
Southern white establishment in the strongest possible terms. For 
example, Senator Harry F. Byrd, the patriarch of the political system 
in the state of Virginia, analogized the proposed statute on voting 
rights to actions taken by Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin and declared 
that, taken together, Truman’s proposals comprised “a mass invasion 
of states’ rights never before even suggested, much less 
recommended, by any previous President of any party affiliation in 
the nation’s history” and “could very conceivably lead to 
dictatorship.”17 
Powell took a similar view of Truman’s civil rights initiatives. 
While insisting that he had never been a racist and that he had always 
had personal friends in the African-American community, Powell 
later conceded that, as late as 1954, he had no difficulty in accepting 
the idea that racial segregation should be mandated by law.18 Thus, in 
1952, Powell worried that, if elected, Democratic presidential 
candidate Adlai Stevenson “will be more successful than Truman in 
obtaining the passage of pet left wing legislation such as [a bill 
establishing the Fair Employment Practices Commission]” and that 
such legislation would accelerate “the trend toward socialism.”19 
Although Stevenson was defeated, Powell would soon be faced with 
the problem of dealing with the Supreme Court’s 1954 decision in 
 
 15.  Special Message to the Congress on Civil Rights, Feb 2, 1948, HARRY S. TRUMAN 
PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY & MUSEUM, https://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php? 
pid=1380&st=&st1= (last visited Mar. 31, 2019).  
 16.  1948 Democratic Party Platform, AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29599 (last visited Mar. 31, 2019).  
 17.  BYRD SAYS ‘RIGHTS’ MEANS DICTATORSHIP: Truman Board Seeks Power of 
Kind Hitler and Stalin Got, He Tells Richmond Rally, N.Y. TIMES, Feb 20, 1948, at 3. 
 18.  JEFFRIES, supra note 6, at 139. 
 19.  A. C. Pritchard, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. and the Counterrevolution in Federal 
Securities Law, 52 DUKE L.J. 841, 855 n.88 (2003) (quoting Justice Powell). 
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Brown v Board of Education,20 which posed a direct challenge to the 
maintenance of the Jim Crow system. 
B. Powell and the Aftermath of Brown 
As the chair of the Richmond school board, Powell was forced to 
directly confront the implications of Brown. After the decision was 
announced, Powell stated privately that “I am not in favor of, and will 
never favor compulsory integration.”21 However, unlike many white 
Southerners, Powell did not believe that Southern whites should 
openly defy the mandates of the Supreme Court. Instead, like other, 
more moderate opponents of school desegregation, he took the view 
that the governments of the Southern states should take measures 
that were formally consistent with the requirements imposed by 
Brown but that nonetheless left the schools almost entirely segregated 
in fact.22 
Initially, it seemed that this view might also shape the official 
policy of the state of Virginia. On November 11, 1955, a committee 
chaired by state senator Garland Gray, and charged by Virginia 
Governor Thomas B. Stanley with the task of making 
recommendations on how best to respond to Brown proposed a 
number of measures designed to provide for the continued existence 
of a system of public education in the state, while at the same time 
“making provision for localities wherein public schools are 
abandoned, and providing educational opportunities for children 
whose parents will not send them to integrated schools.” The 
proposed legislation would have given local school boards broad 
discretion to determine the public schools to which individual 
students would be assigned, subject to the proviso that no student 
would be reassigned from the school that he was currently attending 
absent “good cause shown.” In making assignments under the Gray 
Commission Plan, the local boards would have been authorized to 
consider not only the welfare of the child being assigned, but also “the 
welfare and best interests of all other pupils attending a particular 
 
 20.  347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 21.  JEFFRIES, supra note 6, at 140. 
 22.  See generally ANDERS WALKER, THE GHOST OF JIM CROW: HOW SOUTHERN 
MODERATES USED BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION TO STALL CIVIL RIGHTS (2009) 
(describing the ideology of white Southern moderates and the tactics that they employed in 
detail). 
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school,” as well as other factors such as the availability of facilities 
and transportation, and the “health [and] aptitude of the child.”23 
In addition to proposing that local school boards be allowed great 
discretion in assigning students to schools, the Gray Commission 
report also made a number of other specific proposals that were 
clearly intended to limit the potential impact of the Brown decisions. 
The report advocated the adoption of measures that would have 
declared that no student should be required to attend an integrated 
school and that school districts that chose to close their public schools 
rather than submit to integration should be empowered to raise and 
spend public funds for tuition grants that would defray the cost of 
attendance at private schools. Moreover, the report called for 
legislation designed to ensure that even in those districts where the 
public schools remained open, tuition grants would be made available 
in order to “prevent enforced integration . . . by providing for the 
education of those children whose parents object to their education at 
mixed schools.”24 
The Gray Commission report left Powell somewhat conflicted. 
Soon after the report was issued, Powell stated his position clearly in a 
letter to David J. Mays, who had served as legal counsel to the 
commission. On one hand, Powell expressed his opposition to the idea 
of tuition grants, asserting that “I am confident that [the provision of 
tuition grants] will not work in Richmond, and I doubt that it will 
work anywhere else constitutionally for any length of time.” On the 
other, while conceding that the pupil assignment procedure described 
by the report had “some very troublesome aspects,” Powell 
characterized the use of that procedure as “the best possible 
approach.”25 
All parties to the controversy understood that the student 
assignment process envisioned by the Gray Commission was expected 
to be used to prevent or retard the integration of the public schools in 
Virginia. Nonetheless, many white Virginians believed that even the 
Gray Commission report as a whole did not provide for a sufficiently 
 
 23.  Virginia Commission on Public Education, Hearings on the Nominations of William 
H. Rehnquist and Lewis F. Powell, Jr., of Virginia, November 11, 1955, at 8–11, 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/granule/GPO-CHRG-REHNQUIST-POWELL/GPO-CHRG-
REHNQUIST-POWELL-7-4-14 (last visited Mar. 31, 2019).  
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Letter from LFP to David J. Mays, December 1, 1955, Box 250, Folder 13, Lewis F. 
Powell Papers, Washington and Lee University (hereinafter LFP Papers). 
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aggressive response to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Brown I 
and Brown II. Thus, on February 24, 1956, Byrd called for “massive 
resistance” to the idea of integrating the public schools. Supporters of 
this concept argued that the state could legitimately “interpose” its 
authority to prevent unconstitutional interference by the federal 
government with local prerogatives—a theory that called to mind the 
concept of nullification that had at times been deployed 
unsuccessfully by Southerners prior to the Civil War.26 
In August, 1955, the state legislature adopted a series of measures 
designed to implement the policy of massive resistance.27 Unlike the 
Gray Commission proposals, under the new program, control over the 
placement of students was transferred to a state Pupil Placement 
Board, which was composed of members who were staunchly opposed 
to even token integration. The legislature also required the state to 
withdraw funding from any local school district that attempted to 
desegregate its classrooms and to close the public schools in those 
districts. Other legislation provided for the use of tuition grants to 
allow students to attend segregated private schools in districts where 
the public schools were no longer open. 
Although he made no public comment on the desegregation 
controversy, in private communications with other members of the 
political establishment, Powell made no secret of his personal opinion 
of these measures. While he was in general a loyal supporter of the 
Byrd organization at the time that Brown I was decided, Powell 
strongly opposed the idea of massive resistance, characterizing the 
concept as “legal nonsense” and “a doctrine of chaos—not of law.”28 
At one point, Powell made tentative arrangements to have his assault 
on interposition published in the American Bar Association Journal. 
However, after consultations with the Hunton, Williams attorneys 
who were representing Prince Edward County in the ongoing 
desegregation litigation, he withdrew the proposal and made no other 
public comment on massive resistance.29 
In theory, of course, Powell might have taken the moral high 
ground and refused to make any concessions to supporters of the 
position taken by the Byrd organization. However, he and the other 
members of the school board took the view that such an approach 
 
 26.  JEFFRIES, supra note 6, at 137–38.  
 27.  These measures are described in Jeffries, supra note 6, at 136. 
 28.  Id. at 149. 
 29.  Id. at 149–50. 
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would have had a disastrous impact on the Richmond public schools. 
Indeed, as Powell observed later, the school board believed that, given 
the existing state laws and climate of public opinion in Virginia in the 
period immediately following the Brown decisions, “had we 
attempted to integrate the schools [during this period] this would 
have resulted in closing the schools.”30 Moreover, such fears were by 
no means unfounded; for example, in 1958, the governor of Virginia 
ordered the closure of the public schools in the cities of 
Charlottesville and Norfolk after federal courts mandated the 
desegregation of the schools in both districts.31 
By contrast, at least in the abstract, Powell and the other members 
of the Richmond school board had more options in the wake of two 
judicial decisions that were handed down in January, 1959. In James v. 
Almond, a three-judge federal district court held that the state could 
not constitutionally close the Norfolk public schools in order to avoid 
desegregation, declaring that 
the Commonwealth of Virginia . . . cannot act . . . to close one or 
more public schools in the state solely by reason of the assignment to, 
or enrollment or presence in, that public school of children of 
different races or colors, and, at the same time, keep other public 
schools throughout the state open on a segregated basis.32 
Although the Almond court itself explicitly left open the 
possibility that the state could withdraw its support from all of the 
public schools in the state, on the same day, in Harrison v. Day, the 
Virginia Supreme Court foreclosed this option, concluding that 
section 129 of the Virginia constitution imposed a “mandatory duty” 
on the state legislature to fund a public school system.33 
Faced with this new reality, on February 5, 1959, Virginia Governor 
J. Lindsay Almond, Jr. established a new commission chaired by state 
senator Mosby Perrow, Jr. and charged that commission with the task 
of reformulating the state’s approach to the issue of desegregation. 
Some staunch opponents of integration urged the commission to 
recommend that the state repeal section 129. They argued that this 
change in the state constitution would pave the way for the 
elimination of state support for public schools and the establishment 
 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id. at 136–37. 
 32.  170 F. Supp. 331, 337 (E.D. Va. 1959) (per curiam) . 
 33.  106 S.E.2d 636 (1959). 
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of a system of private segregated academies organized on a local basis 
and supported by tuition grants appropriated from state funds.34 
In a March 10 letter to Byrd, Powell urged him not to embrace this 
proposal.35 Powell’s opposition to the repeal movement was not based 
on support for the concept of desegregation. Instead, arguing that the 
elimination of state funding of public education would be unwise and 
that, if section 129 were repealed, “any system of private schools 
supported directly or indirectly with state funds would inevitably go 
down before the federal court,”36 he insisted that “if the unhappy 
choice becomes inevitable (as it apparently will) between the 
abandonment or emasculation of public education or some 
integration, I believe that Virginia must choose the latter.”37 
But at the same time, Powell also suggested that the state adopt 
measures that would, in his words, “ameliorate or retard integration.” 
He gave as one example the pupil assignment plan that had been 
created by the Pearsall Committee in North Carolina.38 Much like the 
regime that had been proposed by the Gray Commission, the Pearsall 
Plan vested the power to assign students in local school boards, which 
in turn were expected to make their decisions based on “natural racial 
preference and the administrative determination of what is best for 
the child.”39 
The practical consequences of this approach were entirely 
predictable. After the Pearsall plan was adopted, many school boards 
refused to allow any African-American students to transfer to 
previously all-white schools, while other school boards allowed only 
token desegregation of local schools.40 Thus, Powell’s embrace of this 
plan can only be viewed as a reflection of a belief that the officials 
charged with the administration of the public schools in Virginia 
should, if possible, act to minimize the impact of formal desegregation 
on the actual racial composition of the schools in Richmond and 
elsewhere. 
 
 34.  LFP to Harry Byrd, March 10, 1959, Box 6, Folder 5 LFP Papers supra note 25, at 1. 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Id. at 3. 
 37.  Id. at 1–2. 
 38.  Id. at 4. 
 39.  Pearsall Committee, The Pearsall Plan to Save Our Schools, UNC GREENSBORO, 
http://libcdm1.uncg.edu/cdm/ref/collection/CivilRights/id/533 (last visited April 8, 2019).   
 40.  See generally WALKER, supra note 22, at Ch. 2. (discussing the evolution and impact of 
the Pearsall Plan). 
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Nonetheless, Powell believed that the issue of desegregation was 
only one of the factors that should be considered in making more 
general policy judgments regarding the proper functioning of the 
Richmond school district as a whole. Soon after he had dispatched his 
letter to Byrd, this point was clearly illustrated by the role taken by 
Powell in the discussions of a plan to build two new high schools to 
meet the needs of the city’s burgeoning student population. The 
school board had proposed to locate the new schools in white 
neighborhoods that were close to areas with growing African-
American populations. However, when the board sought funding for 
the project from the Richmond city council, some members of the 
council opposed the request on the ground that building new schools 
at the proposed locations would facilitate integration.41 
Powell, on the other hand, sought to characterize the impact of the 
new high schools quite differently. In his first public comment on the 
dispute over desegregation, he observed that some integration had 
become inevitable. He contended that, given this reality, “the new 
schools would appreciably improve both the short and long range 
prospect for minimizing the impact of integration.” He asserted that 
the new schools themselves could be reserved for white children, 
which would in turn allow other facilities currently used by whites to 
be freed for use in educating African-American children. In contrast, 
he claimed, the failure to build the new schools would in time result in 
greater overcrowding at African-American schools, thereby increasing 
the pressure for integration. Powell also took the opportunity to 
declare that “we foresee no substantial integration in the elementary 
schools in Richmond.”42 Powell’s defense of the school board 
proposal apparently mollified the supporters of segregation, and the 
funding for the project was approved by the council. 
More than two decades later, Powell claimed in a private 
memorandum to his children that it was necessary to publicly express 
his opposition to desegregation in order to obtain approval of the 
necessary funding from the city council.43 However, the evidence does 
not support the suggestion that, if given the option in 1959, Powell 
would have moved aggressively to desegregate the Richmond public 
 
 41.  JEFFRIES, supra note 6, at 155. 
 42.  Powell Outlines Views of School Board, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, May 7, 1959, at 
5–6.  
 43.  “Desegregation Era—Interposition/Massive Resistance,” Memorandum from LFP to 
my Children, August 23, 1983, p. 2, LFP Papers, Box 1, Folder 22. 
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schools. Instead, both Powell’s letter to Byrd and his subsequent 
actions plainly indicate that, at least at this point in his life, the future 
Supreme Court Justice remained hostile to the prospect of substantial 
integration of the Richmond schools. 
In 1960, this attitude was reflected in the Richmond school board’s 
internal discussions of a decision to attempt to convert Chandler 
Junior High School to a school serving African-Americans of both 
junior and senior high school age. At the time that the conversion was 
under consideration, Chandler was a school for white children that 
was located more than two miles south of the site of the new John 
Marshall High School and was near the northern border between 
Richmond’s African-American and white residential neighborhoods. 
The main impetus behind the effort to convert the school was the 
need to provide facilities to accommodate the growing number of 
minority students attending the city schools.44 
Prior to 1960, a number of other previously all-white schools had 
been converted for the same reasons. The members of the school 
board believed that, once the new John Marshall High School was 
completed, it could accommodate the white students who would 
otherwise have been assigned to Chandler, and that the conversion of 
Chandler would be the least expensive method of relieving the 
overcrowding that plagued a number of other African-American 
schools in Richmond in 1960. In addition, however, the school board 
saw the conversion of Chandler as an integral part of a strategy that 
was designed to limit the extent of integration in the Richmond 
school district more generally.45 
The view that the conversion would in fact limit integration was at 
least implicitly based on a number of assumptions. First, in 1960, the 
school board and its staff clearly believed that they would at some 
point be ordered by a federal court to abandon the policy of 
maintaining schools that were formally segregated by race. Second, 
they apparently believed that any desegregation order would 
probably be based upon geographical principles. Finally, the school 
board assumed that the African-American population of Richmond 
would continue its historical pattern of expanding northward within 
 
 44.  “Chandler High School,” Memorandum to Members of the Richmond School Board 
from H. I. Willett, February 18, 1960, LFP Papers, Box 250, Folder 14; Memorandum to LFP 
from Assistant Superintendents Richmond Public Schools, February 22, 1960, id. 
 45.  Memorandum from Assistant Superintendents Richmond Public Schools, supra note 
44, at 2. 
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the city.46 Thus, although the site chosen for John Marshall was well 
north of the areas occupied by the African-American community in 
1959, many residents of Richmond (including the members of the 
school board itself) believed that significant numbers of African-
American families would move closer to the new school within a 
relatively short period of time. 
Given these assumptions, from the perspective of those who, like 
Powell, wished to limit the scope of integration, the strategic 
advantages of the proposed Chandler conversion were clearly 
apparent. Unlike the new site of John Marshall, Chandler was located 
on the northern edge of the territory already populated by African-
American families. Therefore, in 1959, from a purely geographical 
perspective, all high school students from that community were living 
closer to Chandler than to the John Marshall site. Moreover, most 
African-Americans would continue to be in closer proximity to 
Chandler for a considerable time even after the residential 
boundaries of their community spread northward. 
As a result, the school officials in Richmond believed that, if at 
some point in the future a federal judge ordered students to be 
assigned purely on the basis of geography, the conversion of Chandler 
to an African-American school serving both junior and senior high 
school students “would be strategically located to protect the new 
John Marshall High School [which was itself designed to serve grades 
eight through twelve] from massive integration.” Conversely, the 
school board thought that unless Chandler was converted, the only 
cure for the overcrowding at existing African-American schools 
would be to transfer some African-Americans from overcrowded 
facilities to underutilized white schools and that, without conversion, 
Chandler itself would become vulnerable to “massive” integration.47 
The members of the school board also viewed the conversion of 
Chandler as a crucial element in the board’s defense against a class 
action lawsuit that had been filed in September, 1958, on behalf of 
African-American students who had been denied the opportunity to 
attend white schools in Richmond. A majority of the African-
American plaintiffs who were seeking to transfer wished to attend 
Chandler. Moreover, school officials understood that, in order to 
 
 46.  Memorandum from Thomas C. Little to H. I. Willett, February 18, 1960, LFP Papers, 
Box 250, Folder 14. 
 47.  Memorandum, Assistant Superintendents to LFP, supra note 44, at 1. 
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prevail in the lawsuit, at the very least they would need to claim that 
African-Americans had access to equal educational opportunities in 
the city public schools, a position that would be much more difficult to 
maintain if the existing African-American schools remained 
substantially overcrowded. Thus, in a February 22, 1960 memorandum 
to Powell, the assistant superintendent of the Richmond schools 
observed that, if Chandler were not converted to use by African-
American students, “there could be no immediate relief of the 
crowded conditions in Negro schools except through integration”48 
and “it is feared that the case in the [f]ederal court would be 
jeopardized.”49 
Despite these considerations, the proposal to convert Chandler 
created a political firestorm. Although in the short term the 
conversion would have relieved the overcrowding in the city’s 
African-American schools, some Richmond civil rights leaders 
complained that the very idea of conversion derived from the same 
basic concept of segregated schools that had been condemned in 
Brown.50 However, much of the opposition came from an entirely 
different quarter: white residents who lived near Chandler and were 
intent on preventing the spread of the African-American community 
into their neighborhoods. 
   These residents believed that the creation of a school for 
African-Americans near the existing boundary would incentivize 
African-Americans to attempt to purchase property on the all-white 
“Northside,” which was also near Chandler. The school board itself 
had concluded that this area would eventually become inhabited by 
African-Americans in any event.51 However, many whites who lived 
near Chandler disagreed. Thus, for example, while conceding in a 
letter to Powell that “the School Board cannot control or prevent . . . 
population shifts,” one opponent of the conversion observed that 
“[the board] can speed or force them” and insisted that “that is 
exactly what the decision to convert Chandler would do.”52 
The dispute over the proposed conversion came to a head at a 
public meeting on February 24, 1960, attended by nearly 1,400 people. 
The crowd was dominated by whites from the Northside, and a 
 
 48.  Id. at 1. 
 49.  Id. at 2. 
 50.  JEFFRIES, supra note 6, at 157–59. 
 51.  “Chandler High School,” supra note 44, at 3. 
 52.  W. F. Maldeis to LFP, March 22, 1960, LFP Papers, Box 250, Folder 14. 
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number of the speakers emphasized what they viewed as the potential 
impact of the conversion on the geographical expansion of the 
African-American community into their neighborhood. By contrast, 
when civil rights leader Oliver H. Hill rose to advocate integration 
rather than conversion, Hill was subjected to what he later described 
as “an uproar of boos, catcalls and epithets” and was allowed to 
continue only after Powell stood beside him and insisted on the 
restoration of order.53 
In the face of this vocal opposition, the school board voted to 
defer the conversion of Chandler in order to allow for “the 
opportunity, without haste or political pressure, for calm and objective 
reconsideration of all possibilities.” In its public statement 
announcing the decision, the board reiterated its view that “the 
conversion of Chandler should minimize the integration problem 
which faces Richmond.”54 At the same time, however, the board 
insisted that “the plan to convert was based entirely on unrelated 
considerations.”55 
Powell’s endorsement of the Pearsall Plan and support for the 
Chandler conversion were consistent with the position that he had 
originally taken on the Gray Committee proposals in 1955. Moreover, 
the removal of the possibility that desegregation would lead to closure 
of the Richmond public schools did nothing to change the basic 
structure of the city school system during the remainder of the time 
that Powell served as the chair of the school board. Each of the 
schools in the system was explicitly labeled either “white” or 
“Negro,” and although the state Pupil Placement Board remained 
formally responsible for assigning students, until August 15, 1960, the 
state board uniformly assigned white students to white schools and 
African-Americans to “Negro” schools. On that date, the board 
allowed two African-American students to enter Chandler, thereby 
rendering the debate over conversion moot.56 
 
 53.  Sandra Day O’Connor, A Tribute to Lewis F. Powell, Jr., 101 HARV. L. REV. 395, 410–
11 (1987). 
 54.  Decision Postponed on Chandler School, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Feb. 25, 1960, 
at 1. 
 55.  Id. at 4. 
 56.  ROBERT A. PRATT, THE COLOR OF THEIR SKIN: EDUCATION AND RACE IN 
RICHMOND, VIRGINIA, 1954-1989 25 (1992). 
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C. The Ongoing Struggle Over the Desegregation of the Richmond 
Schools 
The dispute over the conversion of Chandler marked Powell’s last 
confrontation with the issue of desegregation as a member of the 
Richmond school board. In January, 1961, he resigned from that 
position after accepting an appointment to the Virginia State Board of 
Education and thereafter had no official input into the policy 
decisions that determined the course of desegregation in the city. 
Nonetheless, Powell retained a keen interest in the affairs of the 
school system in general and the problem of desegregation in 
particular. In 1963, he was one of a number of prominent attorneys 
who were asked by Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy to discuss 
the prospects for improvement in race relations in their local 
communities. Powell’s reply once again reflected his attitude toward 
the basic idea of school desegregation.57 
The events that had taken place in the years immediately 
following Powell’s departure from the school board provided the 
backdrop for his assessment of the situation. As already noted, during 
this period, the state Pupil Placement Board had retained the 
authority to make student assignments in the city schools. Moreover, 
even after the admission of African-Americans to Chandler in 1960, 
until 1963, every school in the city continued to be labeled either 
“white” or “Negro” by the city school board, and also drew students 
from a designated attendance area. Absent a specific request to the 
contrary, each student was initially assigned to the school which 
corresponded to his race and the attendance zone in which he or she 
lived, and after having graduated from their elementary schools, 
students were routinely assigned to junior high schools and high 
schools associated with the same race. In addition, African-American 
students who wished to transfer to white junior or senior high schools 
were required to meet academic standards that were not applied to 
white students from the same attendance area. As a result, during the 
1962 school year, of the over twenty-three thousand African-
American students in the Richmond public school system, only thirty-
seven attended schools with white students.58 
After this system was found unconstitutional in federal court, the 
Richmond school board formally changed its policy. In March, 1963, 
 
 57.  LFP to Robert F. Kennedy, July 23, 1963, LFP Papers, Box 209, Folder 3. 
 58.  Bradley v. Sch. Bd. of the City of Richmond, 317 F.2d 429, 432 (1963). 
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the board adopted a series of resolutions that required each student 
entering the system to affirmatively state which school he wished to 
attend, and to repeat the process at the time that he entered junior 
high school and high school. The resolutions also provided for free 
transfers between schools.59 While eliminating the formal 
consideration of race from the process, in practice the new system had 
only a very limited impact on the demographic makeup of the 
individual schools. Thus, in the fall of 1963, only 312 African-
American students attended school with their white counterparts in 
Richmond.60 As a result, in his response to Kennedy’s request, even 
Powell was forced to acknowledge the fact that the desegregation of 
the city schools was “naturally not progressing as rapidly as Negro 
leaders would wish.” He also noted that the actions of the school 
board were being challenged in federal court.61 
Despite this lack of concrete results, Powell’s letter to Kennedy 
described the situation in Richmond as “generally satisfactory.” 
Apparently referring to the admission of the two African-American 
students to Chandler in 1960, he noted that the process of 
desegregation had begun during the period in which he had chaired 
the school board. In addition, Powell observed that “each year the 
extent of integration increases” and predicted that “as long as this is 
accomplished gradually and without too much public pressure, there 
will be a large measure of acceptance by whites.”62 
This assessment aptly reflected Powell’s attitude toward the 
desegregation of the Richmond public schools more generally. Unlike 
the supporters of massive resistance, by the late 1950s, he had (albeit 
reluctantly) demonstrated a willingness to accept the reality that 
formal segregation would have to be abandoned. However, Powell 
had no real commitment to the ideal of integration in practice. 
Instead, he firmly believed that, in deference to the sensibilities of 
white residents of Richmond, the process of integration should 
proceed only at a pace that Powell characterized as “gradual,” but 
that most objective observers would more likely have described as 
glacial. 
 
 59.  Id.; PRATT, supra note 56, at 36.  
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D. Powell and the Prince Edward County Schools 
The same attitude that had marked his approach to desegregation 
in Richmond was also reflected in Powell’s actions when, as a member 
of the state board of education, he was called upon to deal with the 
fallout from the ongoing struggle over desegregation in Prince 
Edward County. After the collapse of statewide massive resistance in 
1959, the government authorities in Prince Edward County had closed 
the county public schools to avoid submitting to even token 
desegregation. The public schools in the county remained closed until 
they were ordered reopened by the Supreme Court in 1964. In the 
interim, the white students in the county attended segregated private 
academies that had been created to replace the public schools. 
At first, the private academies were financed in part by state 
tuition grants and also received additional financial support from the 
county government. However, in August, 1961, a federal court issued 
an order barring state officials from “receiving, processing or 
approving applications for state scholarship grants from persons 
residing in Prince Edward County so long as the public schools of 
Prince Edward County remained closed.”63 Thus, from 1961 through 
1963, the white students attending the segregated academies were 
forced to finance their educations entirely from private funds. 
Ironically, the Supreme Court’s 1964 decision in Griffin v. County 
School Board,64 which required that the public schools of Prince 
Edward County be reopened, gave new hope to the proponents of 
tuition grants. On its face, Griffin was a major defeat for the 
remaining supporters of massive resistance. But by ordering that the 
schools be reopened, the decision also appeared to remove the 
predicate for the ban on the payment of tuition grants. Thus, after 
Griffin was decided, Virginia’s attorney general expressed the view 
that the prohibition imposed by the earlier court order was no longer 
in force. Against this background, although Powell had privately 
complained that “Prince Edward [County] is increasingly becoming a 
serious reflection on the good name of Virginia,” on July 1, 1964, he 
joined the other members of the state board of education in 
approving applications for the payment of tuition grants for the 
 
 63.  Allen v. Cty. Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward Cty, 198 F. Supp. 497, 504 (E.D. Va. 1961) 
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previous school year, notwithstanding the fact that the deadline for 
applying for such grants had passed and that in 1963.65 
While James Jeffries argues that Powell saw the vote as nothing 
more than a decision to effectuate the will of the legislature,66 Powell’s 
communications with Harry Byrd suggest a different explanation for 
his support of the motion to extend the deadline. Admittedly, in 1955, 
Powell had been flatly opposed to the use of public funds to support 
tuition grants. By 1959, however, his views had apparently changed. 
Clearly referring to localities such as Prince Edward County, in the 
same letter in which he advocated the adoption of a Pearsall-type plan 
to deal with the situation in places such as Richmond, Powell also 
observed that “there are many areas in Virginia that will simply not 
tolerate integration,” and contended that “it is . . . necessary to 
provide these communities with some acceptable alternative” by 
“provid[ing] the means for local communities and possibly individuals 
to experiment with alternatives.”67 Thus, Powell suggested that it 
would be appropriate for the state to provide funds for tuition grants 
that would predictably be used to support the establishment of 
segregated private schools in those areas, notwithstanding his 
conviction that “such schools will [not], on the average be anything 
like as satisfactory as state supervised public school education.”68 
Considered against the background of his other actions, Powell’s 
willingness to countenance the use of tuition grants in this context 
should not be construed as reflecting approval of the tactics used by 
jurisdictions such as Prince Edward County in an effort to avoid 
desegregation. Instead, he apparently believed simply that, given the 
reality of the attitude of whites toward desegregation, providing 
tuition grants for school-aged children would be the best of a set of 
bad options available to the state government. Powell’s decision to 
approve the applications for tuition grants in 1964 may well have 
reflected a similar calculation. 
Whatever considerations in fact influenced Powell’s vote, the 
practical import of his choice was clear. By supporting the waiver of 
the application deadline, he voted to reduce the financial cost to white 
students of the decision to abandon the public school system in order 
to avoid attending schools with African-Americans and also implicitly 
 
 65.  JEFFRIES, supra note 6, at 176. 
 66.  Id. at 176–77. 
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refused to condemn such resistance to desegregation. Thus, at the very 
least, Powell’s vote on the tuition grant issue once again demonstrates 
that during the mid-1960s, he had no particular interest in advancing 
the process of integrating the schools. 
E. Powell and School Busing 
In 1970, Powell rejoined the public debate over desegregation 
during the Supreme Court’s consideration of Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education.69 Neither the city of Richmond nor 
the state of Virginia was directly involved in the Swann litigation. 
Nonetheless, it was the evolving situation in the Richmond school 
system that provided the backdrop for Powell’s participation in the 
case. 
In the late 1960s, the placement of students in the Richmond 
schools was governed by the freedom of choice plan that had been 
adopted by the Richmond school board in 1962, ultimately accepted 
by the plaintiffs in the Bradley litigation, and finally implemented 
during the 1966-67 school year. As already noted, under this plan, the 
parents of the students in the public schools were allowed to have 
their children attend any public school in the city, provided only that 
the curriculum was suitable and space was available. However, as in 
most jurisdictions, the advent of freedom of choice had only a limited 
impact on the racial composition of the individual public schools in 
Richmond. 
A variety of factors contributed to this reality. Residential 
neighborhoods in Richmond remained highly segregated, and in many 
cases African-Americans were reluctant to venture into other parts of 
the city to attend schools where the other members of the student 
body often resented their presence. White students were even more 
reluctant to travel significant distances to attend schools with large 
African-American populations. In addition, because Richmond did 
not provide free transportation for public school students, those who 
did not attend their neighborhood schools and relied on public 
transportation often incurred substantial financial costs.70 
The impact of the combination of residential segregation and the 
ongoing preference of students for their neighborhood schools was 
reflected in the continuing racial imbalance in the individual schools. 
 
 69.  402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
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During the 1969-70 school year, the student bodies of seven of the 
seventeen secondary schools in Richmond were at least eighty-eight 
percent African-American, and in five of the other schools, the 
student body was more than ninety percent white. Similarly, twenty-
one of the forty-four elementary schools in the city were at least 
ninety percent African-American, while seventeen of the remaining 
twenty-three schools were at least eighty-six percent white.71 
However, the Supreme Court’s 1968 decision in Green v. New Kent 
County Board of Education72 dramatically changed the jurisprudential 
landscape of the struggle over desegregation. Green came to the 
Court as a challenge to the student assignment policy of New Kent 
County, a small rural county in Virginia that had operated one school 
providing elementary and secondary education for all white students 
and one school providing the analogous services to all African-
American students until 1965.73 In that year, in response to a newly 
filed law suit and the threat of losing federal funding, the school 
district adopted a freedom of choice plan, which essentially allowed 
students in the district to choose to attend either of the two schools.74 
By 1968, fifteen percent of the county’s African-American students 
had chosen to attend the formerly all-white school, but no white 
students had chosen to attend the formerly all-African-American 
school.75 Despite these results, the plan met the guidelines that had 
been established by the Department of Health, Education and 
Welfare, which was responsible for administering the relevant 
portions of the Civil Rights Act.76 
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court unanimously held that the 
freedom of choice plan was not an adequate remedy for past 
segregation. Justice Brennan’s opinion for the Court clearly reflected 
the impact that Southern intransigence had had on the thinking of the 
justices. Beginning with the premise that, under Brown, “school 
boards such as [that of New Kent county were] clearly charged with 
the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to 
convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be 
 
 71.  Id. at 46. 
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eliminated root and branch,”77 Brennan noted the refusal of the New 
Kent County School Board to take any steps toward disestablishment 
of its dual school system in the years immediately following the 
decision in Brown. Observing that “this deliberate perpetuation of the 
unconstitutional dual system can only have compounded the harm of 
such a system,”78 Brennan wrote that “the time for mere ‘deliberate 
speed’ has run out”79 and declared that “the burden on a school board 
today is to come forward with a plan that promises realistically to 
work, and promises realistically to work now.”80 
In Green itself, the implications of this requirement for the 
formulation of a remedy were relatively clear. As Justice Brennan 
observed in a footnote, because housing in the county was not 
segregated by race, “the elimination of the dual school system and the 
establishment of a ‘unitary, nonracial system’ could be readily 
achieved with a minimum of administrative difficulty by means of 
geographic zoning.”81 By contrast, in urban areas such as Richmond, 
which were marked by segregated housing patterns, a simple 
requirement that students be assigned to the schools nearest their 
homes often in reality produced schools whose student bodies in fact 
were either overwhelmingly white or overwhelmingly African-
American. Moreover, the situation was further complicated by the 
fact that, in May, 1969, a state court had approved the annexation of 
an overwhelmingly white portion of nearby Chesterfield County 
whose residents thereafter accounted for nearly twenty percent of the 
population of the newly-expanded city.82 Thus, in 1969, the precise 
implications of the Green standards for the configuration of the 
Richmond public schools were not entirely clear. 
Against this background, on March 10, 1970, the plaintiffs in 
Bradley filed a motion requesting the district court to order the school 
board to adopt a plan that would create greater racial balance in the 
Richmond schools.83 After District Judge Robert R. Mehridge, Jr. 
ordered the school board to provide a plan that created a “unitary” 
system of public schools, the board submitted a proposal that was 
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devised by the representatives of the federal department of Health, 
Education and Welfare.84 The HEW proposal relied heavily on the 
concept known as “grade pairing,” providing that black and white 
schools serving similar geographic attendance zones would be 
“paired” by having each school serve different grade levels.85 
Mehridge, however, concluded that this proposal did not provide an 
adequate remedy for past segregative acts.86 
Asserting that the HEW proposal was, “in essence, a 
neighborhood school plan,” and that the proposal was “basically a 
zoning plan, with some clustering of schools,” Mehridge observed that 
the drafters of the plan gave little consideration to race per se, but 
instead focused on issues such as “the capacity of the school buildings, 
the proximity of the buildings to the pupil population, and factors 
such as the safety hazards on the immediate approaches to the schools 
in relation to where the pupils lived.” While conceding that “under 
certain circumstances [a neighborhood school plan] undoubtedly 
would be commendable,” Judge Mehridge insisted that 
by reason of the residential patterns in the City of Richmond, 
however, wherein there are with rare exceptions distinct White 
areas and distinct Black areas, a true neighborhood school plan of 
necessity can result only in a system in which there are Black 
schools and White schools and not just schools.87 
Judge Mehridge buttressed this assertion by describing the impact 
that the implementation of the HEW plan would have had on each of 
the individual schools in the Richmond school district. Under the 
plan, African-Americans would have comprised more than ninety 
percent of the student body in eighteen different schools in the 
district.88 Conversely, whites would have comprised at least eighty 
percent of the student body in thirteen different schools in the 
district.89 Moreover, in each of the ten schools located in the newly 
annexed area that had previously been part of Chesterfield County, 
the student body would have been at least eighty-nine percent white, 
and in nine of the ten schools, whites would have comprised at least 
ninety-five percent of the student body.90 
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Faced with these objections, the school board submitted a new 
proposal on July 23, 1970. The revised plan provided not only for 
pairing, but also for other changes in student assignments, majority to 
minority transfers, and some free transportation of students—
primarily middle school and high school students—who would be 
required to travel significant distances to reach their assigned schools. 
Judge Mehridge observed that the new proposal reflected a good faith 
effort to comply with applicable legal standards and acknowledged 
that the revised plan would significantly improve the racial balance of 
a number of schools in the Richmond system.91 
Nonetheless, Judge Mehridge was not entirely satisfied with the 
terms of the school board proposal. Noting that the proposal left a 
significant number of schools either identifiably white or identifiably 
African-American, Judge Mehridge was particularly disturbed by the 
fact that the student bodies of thirteen elementary schools would 
remain over ninety percent African-American, while four elementary 
schools would be virtually all-white. Because of these issues, Judge 
Mehridge concluded that the school board should be required to 
submit a third plan within ninety days to address his concerns. At the 
same time, however, he recognized that no such plan could be 
approved in time to be implemented for the school year that was to 
begin on August 31, 1970. Thus, he ordered that the July 23 plan 
should form the basis for the assignment of students on an interim 
basis for the 1970-71 school year, with the understanding that 
permanent student placements would be based on the third plan that 
had yet to be submitted or approved.92 
Predictably, significant elements of Richmond’s white community 
strongly opposed the implementation of even the interim plan. White 
parents sometimes complained openly about the consequences of 
having their children attend school with significant numbers of 
African-Americans, and at times whites resorted to a variety of tactics 
in an effort to avoid having their children attend integrated schools. In 
some cases, white students simply abandoned the public schools 
rather than attend the integrated or predominantly African-American 
schools to which they were assigned. Thus, the number of white 
students who actually enrolled in the Richmond schools for the 1970-
 
 91.  Id. at 573. 
 92.  Id. at 575. 
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71 school years was almost twenty-five percent lower than the 
number that had been projected.93 
These events provided the context for Powell’s participation in 
Swann—the first case in which the Supreme Court was called upon to 
review the propriety of a desegregation order much like that which 
Judge Mehridge sought to impose on the Richmond school district. 
Powell was the primary architect of an amicus brief that was filed in 
October, 1970 on behalf of the state of Virginia in Swann.94 In 
describing the interest of the state in the case, the brief conceded that, 
until 1964, any progress toward the desegregation of the public 
schools in Richmond and other Virginia school districts was “an 
unwilling march prodded by the [federal] courts.”95 At the same time, 
however, the brief insisted that “Virginia municipalities are [now] 
attempting in good faith to comply with the mandate of the Equal 
Protection Clause.”96 Conversely, the brief asserted that the orders 
issued by the federal courts had created “chaotic” conditions in many 
school districts.97 
In particular, the brief claimed that the interim order that had 
been issued in August by Mehridge “has resulted in major disruption 
to public education” and “has often led to resentment and even 
fear.”98 In Powell’s view, the negative effects of the interim order were 
likely to be magnified by any final order that was based on the 
principles outlined in Mehridge’s August opinion. Asserting that 
“racial balance alone was the determining factor in [the decision of 
the district court] in the [Richmond case],”99 the brief insisted that 
Judge Mehridge had not given adequate weight to other factors in 
devising a desegregation plan.100 
Powell deployed a variety of different arguments to support his 
contention that racial balance should not be the sina qua non of 
desegregation plans. First, he asserted that nothing in the Court’s 
desegregation cases suggested that the Constitution imposed such a 
 
 93.  PRATT, supra note 56, at 49–51. 
 94.  Brief for the Commonwealth of Virginia as Amicus Curiae, Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (No. 281). 
 95.  Id. at 2. 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id. (footnote omitted). 
 99.  Id. at 5.  
 100.  See id. at 7 (noting that “[t]he court below unduly emphasized racial balance. It also 
failed to recognize the relevance of the neighborhood school and the disadvantages for all races 
of extensive compulsory busing.”). 
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mandate.101 Second, noting that the demographics of cities were 
constantly in flux, he contended that the pursuit of racial balance 
would induce white families to either leave the cities or enroll their 
children in private schools, thereby actually encouraging the 
resegregation of the public schools and “accelerat[ing] the process of 
urban deterioration.”102 
Against this background, Powell argued that the federal courts 
should adopt a radically different approach to desegregation cases. 
While conceding that racial imbalance was a factor that should be 
considered in crafting remedial orders in such cases, he asserted that 
“equal opportunity [should not] be measured purely by equality of 
resource application and racial balance.”103 Instead, in Powell’s view, 
“[the] system [that] best conforms to the constitutional mandate [is 
one] that provides, through equal opportunity for every student, the 
highest level of achievement for all students of every race, 
compensating appropriately for any deficiencies that may have 
resulted from previous racial segregation.”104 Similarly, the brief later 
declared that “the goal is the best education for all”105 and that “what 
. . . the school boards must seek and the courts must approve is the 
means to promote equal educational opportunity, regardless of race, 
in a system structured for the highest achievement.”106 From this 
perspective, the problem with racial segregation was that it was “an 
impediment to be removed in striving to achieve that goal.”107 
The brief also insisted that, in desegregation orders, “reasonable 
discretion must be allowed in the assignment of pupils and the 
administration of a school system.”108 At the same time, Powell clearly 
believed that, absent judicial intervention, the exercise of this 
“reasonable discretion” would lead to the creation of neighborhood 
schools and that, particularly at the elementary school level, 
neighborhood schools were in general most likely to advance 
educational achievement.109 In addition to observing that “the 
 
 101.  Id. at 11–13. 
 102.  Id. at 14–16. 
 103.  Id. at 7. 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  Brief for the Commonwealth of Virginia, supra note 94, at 18. 
 106.  Id. at 19. 
 107.  Id. at 18. 
 108.  Id. at 17. 
 109.  See id. at 23–24 (“The unique educational advantages of the neighborhood school 
system, where it is administered in a manner consistent with the Equal Protection Clause, result 
in the accomplishment of the ultimate goal of that clause: the best possible education for all 
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neighborhood unit provides for ease of access to schools for students, 
minimizing costs and time of travel to and from school,”110 he 
contended that “educational effectiveness . . . is dependent on the 
attitude of parents toward their children’s education, and rationally 
configured systems of neighborhood schools play a vital role.”111 He 
also asserted that “[c]ommunity schools, when designed in such a way 
as to avoid the feelings of disaffection which attend systematic 
ghettoization . . . foster such an active parental role because of their 
very accessibility.”112 
Conversely, while acknowledging that busing of students had in 
the past been used to perpetuate segregation and remained a 
necessity in some rural school districts, the brief was unsparingly 
critical of the use of busing in pursuit of what Powell described as 
“rigorously uniform racial balance.”113 Once again focusing primarily 
on elementary schools, he contended that widespread busing 
“removes a child from a familiar environment and places him in a 
strange one . . . separates the child from parental supervision for 
longer periods of time . . . undermines the neighborhood or 
community school, so desirable at the elementary level . . . and . . . 
adds to already strained budgetary demands.”114 Thus, while 
conceding that some busing might occasionally be appropriate in a 
desegregation plan, Powell concluded that a requirement of 
widespread transportation of students in the pursuit of racial balance 
“could be disastrous to public education.”115 
Powell’s brief in Swann can be analyzed from a variety of different 
perspectives. On one level, the argument in the brief can 
appropriately be viewed as the byproduct of a significant change in 
Powell’s own attitude toward the issue of school desegregation. The 
brief implicitly rejected both the policy of evasion embodied in his 
1959 letter to Harry Byrd and the advocacy of extreme gradualism 
reflected in his 1963 letter to Robert F. Kennedy in favor of a regime 
 
children.”). 
 110.  Id. at 22–23. 
 111.  Id. at 23. 
 112.  Id. at 23–24. 
 113.  See id. at 21–22 (describing what Powell believed to be “[a] notable example of 
unreasonable busing” in Los Angeles). 
 114.  Id. at 22. 
 115.  Id. at 11; see also id. at 24 (“Pursuit of absolute racial balance in major metropolitan 
areas through the use of extensive busing of students deprives the school system of the singular 
advantages of the neighborhood concept, and in at least this respect thwarts the attainment of 
equal educational opportunity.”). 
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in which school districts would be largely indifferent to issues of race 
in the assignment of students—an approach that even Thurgood 
Marshall might well have accepted in the late 1950s.116 Indeed, as 
Powell observed in the brief, the approach that he advocated in Swann 
fit comfortably with the language of Brown II, where the Court had 
suggested that what Brown I required was, among other things, “[the] 
revision of school districts and attendance areas into compact units to 
achieve a system of determining admission to the public schools on a 
nonracial basis . . . .”117 
However, the political and jurisprudential context in which the 
Swann brief was written was far different from that of 1959 and 1963. 
By 1970, even in the South, few if any mainstream politicians would 
have explicitly advocated a policy of either formally segregating the 
public schools or openly attempting to evade the basic thrust of 
Brown I. Moreover, Green had made it clear that, in most cases, even 
freedom of choice plans would no longer be acceptable.118 Thus, 
whether or not Powell’s personal feelings had changed, by 1970 the 
race-blind approach that he advocated in Swann was clearly the least 
intrusive remedial theory that had any chance of winning the support 
of a majority of the justices. 
In any event, the dispute over school desegregation was not the 
only racially-charged issue in which Powell took a personal interest 
during his last years as a private citizen. Shortly before his 
appointment to the Supreme Court, Powell also became personally 
involved in a controversy that implicated the balance of political 
power between whites and African-Americans in Richmond. Not 
surprisingly, Powell’s approach to this controversy reflected much the 
same attitude toward race relations that animated his argument in 
Swann. 
 
 116.  See MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND 
THE SUPREME COURT, 1936-1961 234–35 (1994) (noting that the NAACP did not challenge 
many school desegregation plans because its leaders, including Marshall, “believed that Brown 
established the principle that school boards could not take race into account in assigning 
students to schools . . . .”). 
 117.  Brief for the Commonwealth of Virginia, supra note 94, at 12 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of 
Edu., 349 U.S. 294, 300–01 (1955)). 
 118.  See Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd. of New Kent Cty., 391 U.S. 430, 440–41 (1968) (“[I]f there 
are reasonably available other ways, such for illustration as zoning, promising speedier and 
more effective conversion to a unitary, nonracial school system, ‘freedom of choice’ must be 
held unacceptable.”). 
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F. Annexation and the Voting Rights Act 
The dispute that attracted Powell’s attention to the issue of voting 
rights arose from the long-running effort by the city of Richmond to 
annex a portion of Chesterfield County, a largely suburban 
community that bordered the Richmond city limits. Although the 
annexation effort began in 1961, the officials representing Richmond 
and Chesterfield did not reach an agreement on the terms of the 
annexation until 1969.119 The state courts approved this agreement, 
which provided that twenty-three square miles of the county would be 
transferred to city jurisdiction in exchange for a payment of more 
than twenty-seven million dollars.120 The issues that concerned Powell 
involved the interaction between the annexation process and section 
five of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,121 which prohibited “covered” 
jurisdictions, most of which were located in the South, from changing 
election procedures without first obtaining either the approval of the 
Justice Department or a judgment from the United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia declaring that the use of the new 
procedures would not perpetuate racial discrimination.122 In 1966, the 
Supreme Court rejected a challenge to the constitutionality of the 
preclearance requirement in South Carolina v. Katzenbach,123 and five 
years later, in Perkins v. Mathews,124 a majority of the justices 
concluded that annexations by local government were subject to the 
requirement.125 
At one point, it appeared that the controversy over preclearance 
might be short-lived. Under the original Voting Rights Act, the 
requirement was imposed for only five years,126 and when Congress 
considered extending the life of section five in 1970, the proposal was 
opposed not only by white Southern members of Congress but also by 
the administration of President Richard M. Nixon.127 Initially, the 
 
 119.  The complex maneuvering that ultimately resulted in the annexation of Chesterfield 
County is described in detail in JOHN V. MOESER & RUTLEDGE M. DENNIS, THE POLITICS OF 
ANNEXATION: OLIGARCHIC POWER IN A SOUTHERN CITY (1982). 
 120.  Id. at 123. 
 121.  52 U.S.C.A. § 10304(a) (West 2018). 
 122.  Id.  
 123.  383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966). 
 124.  400 U.S. 379 (1971). 
 125.  Id. at 437. 
 126.  Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub.L. 89–110, Aug. 6, 1965, 79 Stat. 437, 438 (1965) 
(current version at 52 U.S.C.A. § 10304 (West 2018)). 
 127.  J. Morgan Kousser, The Strange, Ironic Career of Section Five of the Voting Rights Act, 
1965-2007, 86 TEX. L. REV. 667, 686–88 (2008). 
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House of Representatives approved a voting rights bill that would 
have allowed the preclearance requirement to lapse.128 However, both 
the House and the Senate ultimately passed what was to become the 
first of a series of extensions of the provisions of section five, and 
Nixon chose to sign the bill into law.129 
These developments provided the backdrop for the dispute over 
the Chesterfield annexation. In 1969, apparently believing that such 
transactions were not subject to section five,  Richmond city officials 
had made no effort to have the annexation precleared by the Justice 
Department.130 However, on January 28, 1971, after the preclearance 
requirement had been extended for an additional five years and 
Perkins had made it clear that annexations were subject to the 
requirement, the Richmond city attorney sent a letter to the United 
States Attorney General asking whether the principles established in 
Perkins applied retroactively to annexations that had been completed 
prior to the decision.131 
On May 7, 1971, the Justice Department sent the Richmond 
authorities a letter that formally objected to the Chesterfield 
annexation.132 The letter focused on the impact of the annexation on 
the demographics of the city of Richmond as a whole. Prior to the 
annexation, the population of Richmond had been fifty-two percent 
African-American. By contrast, since the population of the area 
acquired from Chesterfield County was virtually all white, African-
Americans comprised only forty-two percent of the city’s post-
annexation population. Thus, the Justice Department observed that 
the addition of the new territory “inevitably tends to dilute the voting 
strength of black voters.” Against this background, the letter also 
suggested that “you may . . . wish to consider means of accomplishing 
annexation which would avoid producing an impermissible adverse 
racial impact on voting, including such techniques as single member 
districts.”133 
It was the latter suggestion that provoked a response from Powell. 
Powell had been the chairman of the Charter Commission that 
 
 128.  H.R. 4249, 91st Cong. (1969). 
 129.  Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 52 U.S.C.A.). 
 130.  MOESER & DENNIS, supra note 119, at 146. 
 131.  Id. 
 132.  149–50. 
 133.  MOESER & DENNIS, supra note 119, at 150–51. 
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established the existing form of the Richmond city government, and 
he had come away from the experience firmly convinced of the 
superiority of at-large elections to single member districts in 
municipal governments.134 The strength of this conviction emerged 
clearly in a memorandum that Powell submitted to the Justice 
Department on August 9, 1971.135 
Powell did not formally represent the city of Richmond in its 
dealings with the Justice Department. Instead, he purported to speak 
only as an “interested citizen and the former Chairman of the 
[Charter Commission].”136 Nonetheless, his memorandum strongly 
urged the Justice Department to grant its approval to the Chesterfield 
annexation.137 
The memorandum began with a discussion of the standards that 
Powell believed that the Justice Department should apply in 
considering annexations in jurisdictions that were subject to the 
preclearance requirement.138 Observing that almost any annexation 
would change the ratio of white voters to African-American voters, 
Powell contended that “the fact that voting ratios are changed by 
annexation should be immaterial [to the question of whether a 
proposed annexation should be granted preclearance.]”139 He argued 
that instead, “the test should be whether the predominate [sic] 
purpose [of the annexation] is racial and discriminatory.”140 
Against this background, the memorandum next turned to a 
discussion of the basic policy considerations implicated by the concept 
of annexation generally and in Virginia specifically. Powell noted that 
in Virginia, cities were not included in any county.141 Instead, city and 
county governments were entirely separate political entities, and cities 
had often made efforts to acquire territory from surrounding counties 
during the twentieth century.142 Indeed, the city of Richmond itself 
 
 134.  See LFP to Potter Stewart, February 28, 1980, LFP Case File, City of Mobile v. Bolden, 
No. 77-1844.  
 135.  “City of Richmond—Chesterfield Annexation,” August 9, 1971, LFP Papers, Box 118, 
Folder 9. 
 136.  Id. at 1. 
 137.  Id. at 19. 
 138.  Id. at 4–7. 
 139.  Id. at 6. 
 140.  Id. at 6–7. 
 141.  Id. at 7–11. 
 142.  Id. at 9–10. 
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had annexed nearby territory on ten separate occasions prior to 
1971.143 
Powell vehemently rejected any suggestion that the annexation 
process was intended to provide cities with a mechanism to 
discriminate against African-American voters. Instead, he 
characterized annexations as a natural response to population 
movements over time. He observed that “as a city develops a 
peripheral metropolitan, suburban area, there comes a time when it is 
economically necessary to recapture portions of such [an] area” 
because “the suburban developments . . . deprive the city of essential 
revenues from people who enjoy all the benefits of the metropolitan 
area.”144 Powell contended that, given this reality, “a Virginia city must 
expand its boundaries periodically or the social and economic 
consequences—for blacks and whites alike—are disastrous.”145 He 
also insisted that the Chesterfield annexation in particular was 
justified by “social and economic reasons [that were] deemed 
necessary for the citizens involved” and that there were no “racial 
overtones” in those reasons.146 Instead, he contended that “if there 
had not been a single black voter in the City of Richmond, the 
annexation would have been equally necessary and in the public 
interest.”147 
Indeed, Powell asserted that one of the obstacles to annexation 
had been the fear among white residents of Chesterfield that their 
children might be bussed to predominantly African-American schools 
as part of a court-ordered desegregation plan.148 Conversely, he 
contended that “if the reasoning of the Supreme Court in [Swann] be 
accepted, the blacks and their children (because of the effect on 
desegregation of schools) have far more to gain from this annexation 
than the whites.”149 
The memorandum then turned to the suggestion that the system 
of at-large elections should be replaced by single member districts in 
order to prevent the reduction of the political power of the African-
American community under the post-annexation regime. Arguing that 
 
 143.  Id. at 10. 
 144.  Id. at 9. 
 145.  Id. at 10. 
 146.  Id. at 12. 
 147.  Id. at 17. 
 148.  Id. at 12. 
 149.  Id. at 17–18. 
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“a municipal government (unlike the state or the federal government) 
is strengthened by at-large elections,” Powell insisted that the 
Richmond Charter Commission had followed the “prevailing view of 
the best scholars of municipal government” when it had chosen to 
adopt the at-large system in 1947.150 Observing that under the at-large 
system “each citizen is . . . ‘represented’ by all members [of the city 
council] and not merely by those from his particular ward,” he 
contended that “decisions are [therefore] made, as they should be, on 
the basis of the best interest of the city as a whole.”151 He also 
asserted that “‘log-rolling’ and ‘trade-offs,’ inevitable and destructive 
in a ward system, are rarely found where each councilman is elected 
by an at-large vote.”152 
Powell also rejected the claim that the transition to single member 
districts was necessary to preserve the political influence of African-
Americans in a post-annexation Richmond. While conceding that 
“some black leaders” now advocated the establishment of single 
member districts,153 Powell observed that the African-American 
leadership had generally supported the creation of the at-large system 
when it was first proposed in 1947.154 In addition, he noted that in 
recent years there had been “substantial and increasing black 
participation” in the Richmond city government, and that even after 
annexation African-Americans would be the “single most cohesive 
and influential ‘block’ of voters in the city” and thus that “no 
politician could—even if he desired—afford to ignore their views or 
their welfare.”155 
Like his brief in Swann, Powell’s assessment of the annexation 
process and the political situation in Richmond can be evaluated from 
a variety of different perspectives. His claim that the concept of 
annexation had not traditionally been associated with racial 
considerations found considerable support in the historical record. 
Between 1906 and 1942, the city had annexed substantial portions of 
the neighboring Henrico and Chesterfield counties on four separate 
occasions, with each annexation having significantly expanded both 
the geographical size and population of the city. As Powell noted in 
 
 150.  Id. at 14. 
 151.  Id. 
 152.  Id. at 14–15. 
 153.  Id. at 16. 
 154.  Id. at 15. 
 155.  Id. at 16. 
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his memorandum, racial issues do not appear to have played an 
important role in the consideration of any of these successful efforts 
to expand the limits of the city. For example, although the acquisition 
of almost seventeen square miles of land from Henrico County in 
1942 had added significantly to the total population of Richmond, the 
racial composition of the population of the city had not changed 
significantly between 1940 and 1950.156 
But at the same time, Powell substantially understated the role 
played by racial considerations in the specific annexation that was 
being considered by the Justice Department in 1971. As early as 1960, 
the issue of race had begun to emerge as a major factor in 
determining the success or failure of the city’s attempts to acquire 
additional land and population.157 As African-Americans continued to 
move from the countryside to the city and substantial numbers of 
affluent whites fled the city for the suburbs, the demographics of 
Richmond changed substantially. While African-Americans made up 
only thirty-two percent of the population of Richmond in 1950, by 
1960, forty-two percent of Richmond residents were African-
American.158 Moreover, in the absence of changes in the boundaries 
of the city, the trend was expected to continue, with African-
Americans projected to form a majority of the population in the city 
before the end of the decade.159 
As African-Americans began to comprise a larger percentage of 
the Richmond population, the political importance of the city’s 
African-American community was enhanced as well. Although whites 
continued to dominate the city government until the 1960s, the 
increase in African-American influence had begun with the overhaul 
of the City Charter to which Powell referred in his memorandum. 
Prior to that date, the city had been governed by a council whose 
members were selected from single member districts that were 
gerrymandered to ensure that only whites would be elected to the 
council.160 By contrast, the new charter required all members of the 
council to be selected on an at-large basis.161 Although only one 
African-American was elected under this system prior to 1964, by 
 
 156.  MOESER & DENNIS, supra note 119, at 30.  
 157.  Id. at 35-39. 
 158.  Id. at 30. 
 159.  Id. at 36. 
 160.  Id. at 33. 
 161.  “City of Chesterfield—Richmond Annexation,” supra note 135, at 13–14. 
MALTZ_MACROS (DO NOT DELETE) 5/15/2019  10:28 PM 
2019] THE TRIUMPH OF THE SOUTHERN MAN 205 
1960 the organized African-American vote was in many cases large 
enough to hold the balance of power between competing white 
candidates.162 
Even at this stage, all parties were well aware that the acquisition 
of overwhelmingly white suburbs had the potential to slow or reverse 
the increase in African-American political influence. This reality was 
clearly reflected in the voting patterns in a 1961 referendum on an 
ultimately unsuccessful proposal to merge the city of Richmond with 
nearby Henrico County. While the white voters of Richmond strongly 
supported the proposal, leaders and voters in the African-American 
community generally opposed the merger because they feared its 
impact on the evolving balance of power in the city.163 
While the victory of a single African-American candidate in the 
city council elections of 1964 was viewed by some as a harbinger of a 
new era of racial harmony, the outcome of the 1966 city council 
elections was more disturbing to many members of Richmond’s white 
elite. In that election, the first to be held after the passage of the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the elimination of the poll tax by the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Harper v. Virginia State Board of 
Elections,164 African-Americans comprised thirty-four percent of the 
registered voters in Richmond and, by at least one estimate, thirty-
nine percent of those who actually voted. Moreover, African-
Americans claimed three of the nine seats on the council, with one of 
those seats being filled by Henry Marsh III, a civil rights lawyer who 
was active in school desegregation litigation.165 
After this concrete demonstration of the increasing political 
power of Richmond’s black community, the specter of a city council 
dominated by African-Americans in the near future loomed large in 
the calculations of some white politicians. Shortly after the election, 
the Richmond Times Dispatch observed that “if present political 
trends continue in Richmond, Negro voters will grow steadily 
stronger, and within a very few years they may be able to elect a 
majority of Richmond’s nine Councilmen.”166 Similarly, the Norfolk 
Virginia-Pilot asserted that the results of the 1966 election and 
demographic trends more generally had engendered “a hectic search, 
 
 162.  Id. at 45–49. 
 163.  Id. at 38–39. 
 164.  383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
 165.  MOESER & DENNIS, supra note 119, at 68. 
 166.  Id. at 69. 
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now under way, for a means to re-establish a white majority in the 
city’s population.”167 
Against this background, the issue of annexation loomed large in 
the city council elections of 1968. Annexation was strongly supported 
by candidates endorsed by Richmond Forward, an organization that 
represented the interests of the white establishment in the city. By 
contrast, the Richmond Crusade for Voters, which was dedicated to 
enhancing the political power of African-Americans, was willing to 
support annexation of suburban areas only if the system of at-large 
elections was abandoned in favor of single member districts. The 
racial overtones of the dispute were perhaps most clearly reflected in 
a statement by one of the Richmond Forward candidates, who 
declared that if the city was unable to obtain jurisdiction over 
substantial areas in the suburbs, “Richmond will become a permanent 
black ghetto, a happy hunting ground for ambitious political 
opportunists.”168 
The allies of Richmond Forward retained a majority of the seats 
on the city council in 1968 and were determined to consummate an 
annexation agreement with Chesterfield County prior to the 1970 
elections. In private negotiations with the Chesterfield County 
authorities, Richmond Mayor Philip J. Bagley, Jr. and other Richmond 
officials consistently expressed their desire to add large numbers of 
suburbanites to the city voting rolls, with Bagley at one point 
allegedly declaring that “we don’t want the city to go to the [black 
people]. We need 44,000 white bodies”—almost precisely the number 
ultimately acquired by the city through the annexation agreement.169 
While there is no reason to believe that Powell knew of this 
specific statement, he could not have been unaware of the political 
context in which the debate over the Chesterfield annexation took 
place. At the same time, it would probably be a mistake to attribute 
Powell’s spirited defense of the legality of both the annexation itself 
and the existing at large voting system solely or even primarily to a 
desire to maintain white control of the Richmond city government. 
Instead, his analysis almost certainly reflected the influence of other 
factors. 
 
 167.  Id.  
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 169.  Id. at 93. 
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As his memorandum indicated, Powell believed strongly that 
expansion was necessary to the health of the city of Richmond, that 
the at-large system of selecting council members was far superior to 
one based on single member districts, and that even after annexation 
the interests of African-American residents would be adequately 
protected by the existing system.170 Seen from this perspective, 
Powell’s effort to convince the Justice Department to approve the 
annexation without requiring the alteration of the city government 
might be viewed as less a product of a positive desire to preserve 
white control of the municipal institutions than of indifference to the 
impact that the annexation might have on the balance of power in the 
city. 
In addition, the argument in the Chesterfield memorandum also 
reflected Powell’s instinctive distrust of federal intervention into local 
affairs. Further, he clearly viewed federal intervention in annexation 
disputes as being particularly inappropriate. Thus, in the 
memorandum, he declared that “if state and local self-government are 
to survive in this country, they must be afforded reasonable freedom 
from federal intervention and control.”171 Moreover, while conceding 
that “the Voting Rights Act of 1965 goes quite far,” he insisted that 
“there was no Congressional intent to frustrate state policy with 
respect to annexation and to deny to cities the historic rights to 
expand their boundaries.”172 
In any event, Powell was ultimately unsuccessful in his efforts to 
preserve the system of at-large elections for the Richmond City 
Council. The city was forced to accept the conversion to a regime 
based on single member wards as the price to be paid for retaining the 
territory annexed from Chesterfield.173 Nonetheless, Powell remained 
firmly committed to the principles that shaped his approach to the 
annexation controversy and particularly to the view that any ongoing 
problems of racial discrimination could be adequately addressed 
without disrupting existing institutional arrangements. This view 
clearly informed Powell’s treatment of many of the constitutional 
issues that came before him after he became a member of the 
Supreme Court. 
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III. POWELL ON THE SUPREME COURT 
A. Nomination and Confirmation 
The sequence of events that led to Powell’s nomination to serve 
on the Supreme Court began with the victory of Richard M. Nixon in 
the presidential election of 1968.174 During his campaign to secure the 
Republican nomination, Nixon had promised a group of white 
Southern leaders including Republican Sen. Strom Thurmond of 
South Carolina that, if elected, he would appoint a white Southerner 
to the Court as soon as possible.175 Despite this representation, 
Nixon’s first nomination was Warren E. Burger of Minnesota, whom 
Nixon chose to succeed Chief Justice Earl Warren, who had resigned 
prior to the election.176 By contrast, after Abe Fortas was forced off 
the Court in 1969, Nixon was initially determined to fulfill his pledge 
and replace Fortas with a Southerner.177 Powell’s deep Southern roots, 
long record of public service, and national reputation among the legal 
establishment made him a strong candidate to succeed Fortas.178 
Against this background, unbeknownst to Powell himself, he 
became Nixon’s first choice to fill the vacancy that had been created 
by the Fortas resignation.179 However, before Nixon had made a 
decision on the nomination, Powell sent a letter to the president 
asking not to be considered for the position.180 Nixon then chose 
Clement F. Haynsworth, a native of South Carolina who was serving 
as a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit.181 After the Haynsworth nomination was rejected by the 
Senate, Nixon turned to G. Harrold Carswell of Florida, a judge on 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.182 When the 
Senate also refused to confirm Carswell, complaining about what he 
characterized as unfair prejudice against Southern nominees,183 Nixon 
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then chose Judge Harry F. Blackmun of Minnesota to succeed Fortas, 
and Blackmun was confirmed unanimously in 1970.184 
Nixon was given another opportunity to fulfill his promise to 
appoint a white Southerner when Hugo L. Black and John Marshall 
Harlan left the Court in 1971.185 After floating a number of other 
potential candidates who engendered opposition from a variety of 
different sources, Nixon turned to Powell, whose name was one of 
those on a list that had been compiled by Chief Justice Burger.186 
Although Powell first rebuffed overtures from Attorney General John 
Mitchell, Nixon was ultimately able to persuade Powell to accept the 
nomination, which was announced publicly on October 20, 1971.187 
The Powell nomination created considerable consternation among 
civil rights leaders and some other members of the progressive 
community. For example, describing Powell as “a white Southerner 
who had distinguished himself as one of the great forces against civil 
rights legislation” the head of the Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference called the nominations of Powell and William H. 
Rehnquist “‘insult[s]’ to blacks and poor people.”188 Similarly, John V. 
Lindsay, the progressive Republican mayor of New York City charged 
that Powell was “insensitive to the most basic problems now dividing 
the country.”189 
However, while they clearly would have preferred a nominee who 
was more sympathetic to their political perspective, other progressives 
greeted the Powell nomination with a sense of relief. As one 
prominent civil libertarian observed, while most progressives were not 
“elated or even pleased” with the nomination, they were nonetheless 
“satisfied” with the choice because they believed that Powell would 
bring “learning and professional competence along with a high sense 
of purpose to his new office.”190 Similarly, the New York Times 
asserted that Powell “admirably combines the fundamental 
requirements of legal and intellectual distinction with Mr. Nixon’s 
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insistence on political conservatism.”191 
Despite the indications that his nomination would be relatively 
uncontroversial, Powell prepared with his usual meticulousness for his 
testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee.192 In addition to 
discussions of potential financial conflicts of interests, most of the 
questions from the members of the committee focused on wiretapping 
and other issues related to criminal procedure and the relationship 
between individual rights and national security.193 By contrast, 
Democratic Sen. Edward M. Kennedy of Massachusetts called on 
Powell to explain criticisms that Powell had leveled at Dr. Martin 
Luther King, Jr. during the mid-1960s.194 
Powell had outlined the nature of his disagreements with King in a 
lecture that was delivered at Washington and Lee University in April, 
1966.195 The lecture was, by its terms, a response to King’s celebrated 
“Letter From a Birmingham Jail,” in which King declared that “one 
has a moral responsibility to disobey unjust laws” and contended that 
the use of civil disobedience was justified as part of the campaign 
against racial segregation in the South.196 Powell agreed that people 
had a moral right to resist the government in cases where no other 
means of redress was available.197 But at the same time, he also 
contended that the conditions that might conceivably justify civil 
disobedience were not present in the United States of the mid-1960s 
and described the advocacy of civil disobedience in that context as “a 
heresy which could weaken the foundations of our system of 
government, and make impossible the existence of the human 
freedoms it strives to protect.”198 
Powell acknowledged that “the Negro has had, until recent years, 
little reason to respect the law,” that “[t]he entire legal process, from 
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the police and sheriff to the citizens who serve on juries, has too often 
applied a double standard of justice,” and that the situation had been 
exacerbated by discriminatory state and local laws, denial of voting 
rights, and a general lack of educational and economic opportunities 
for African-Americans.199 Nonetheless, he insisted that “in America 
today . . . despite some conditions of injustice, wrongs can be and 
ultimately are redressed in the courts, the legislatures and through 
other established political institutions.”200 Explicitly analogizing the 
tactics being employed by the civil rights movements to the efforts of 
Southern whites to prevent desegregation through “massive 
resistance,” Powell asserted that “if the decision to break the law 
really turns on individual conscience, it is hard to see in law how Dr. 
King is any better off than former Governor Ross Barnett of 
Mississippi, who also believed deeply in his cause and was willing to 
go to jail.”201 Similarly, characterizing the decisions of the Supreme 
Court overturning the criminal convictions of civil rights 
demonstrators who had been engaging in peaceful civil disobedience 
as “unwelcome and disturbing precedent[s],”202 Powell argued that 
“[i]t would have been wiser public policy, and more consonant with 
the rule of law, to require resort to the courts rather than self-help 
where public facilities . . . are involved in racial controversy.”203 
Powell conceded that, with respect to issues involving race, “civil 
disobedience tactics [have] accelerated the pace of legislative 
reform.”204 But at the same time, he observed that “the ultimate cost 
of this acceleration may be costly indeed—in terms of racial bitterness 
and discord, and particularly in the disrespect for law and order 
engendered and the lawlessness in the streets which the doctrine of 
disobedience has encouraged.”205 Noting that the use of the tactics of 
civil disobedience had already been adopted in protests against a 
variety of causes that were not directly related to the civil rights 
movement, Powell suggested that the increasing acceptance of such 
tactics had contributed to the atmosphere which sparked the violent 
riots of the mid-1960s and concluded by declaring that “due process 
 
 199.  Powell, Jr., supra note 195, at 206–07. 
 200.  Id. at 208. 
 201.  Id. at 210 (quoting Burke Marshall, The Protest Movement and the Law, 51 VA. L. 
REV. 785, 800 (1965)). 
 202.  Id. at 214. 
 203.  Id. at 215. 
 204.  Id. at 217. 
 205.  Id. 
MALTZ_MACROS (DO NOT DELETE) 5/15/2019  10:28 PM 
212 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 14 
and democratic procedures, even though painfully slow at times, are a 
far more dependable and certainly less dangerous means of correcting 
injustice and solving social problems.”206 
In 1968, after race riots swept the nation during the summers of 
1966 and 1967, Powell launched another attack on King’s tactics and 
philosophy. In an article published in the New York State Bar Journal, 
Powell declared that “once lawlessness is tolerated and justified it 
feeds upon itself and leads either to revolution or violent repressive 
measures.”207 Powell acknowledged that King had condemned the 
riots themselves.208 Nonetheless, observing that King had analogized 
the actions of the United States in the Vietnam War to the tactics of 
Nazi Germany and had continued to advocate the use of mass 
demonstrations for the purpose of “‘dislocating northern cities,” 
Powell insisted that King was “arm-in-arm” with the more radical 
members of the African-American community who openly advocated 
the use of violence to oppose what they characterized as the 
fundamental injustices of American society.209 
During the mid-1960s, King was a controversial figure, and 
criticisms of his tactics were not uncommon.210 However, in the wake 
of his assassination in April, 1968—the same month that Powell’s last 
attack was published—King became the iconic symbol of the civil 
rights movement, and by 1971, any suggestion that a candidate for 
high office had a generally unfavorable opinion of King had become 
politically toxic.211 Thus, Kennedy’s question at the confirmation 
hearing created something of a problem for Powell. 
Powell’s response reflected his understanding of the delicacy of 
the situation. He began by reiterating the contention that the 
acceptance of a general right to civil disobedience was “quite contrary 
to the rule of law.”212 But at the same time, he also took care to 
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emphasize that he was not disputing the right to take actions designed 
to provide the opportunity to challenge unjust rules in court and 
declared that King “will be recognized as one of the great leaders of 
his people.”213 In addition, Powell observed that he agreed with the 
views that had recently been expressed by Kennedy confidante 
Archibald Cox, a professor at Harvard Law School and former 
Solicitor General of the United States, who had also recently 
published an article that questioned a generalized right to civil 
disobedience.214 Apparently satisfied with this explanation, Kennedy 
quickly moved on to other matters.215 
Only Democratic Sen. Birch Bayh of Indiana made any effort to 
explore Powell’s role in dealing with the impact of Brown v. Board of 
Education on the Richmond school system.216 Observing that many in 
Virginia had argued that the public schools should be closed rather 
than integrated, and that several Virginia schools had in fact been 
closed, Powell responded to Bayh by asserting that the principle task 
was to keep the schools open. 
217 Noting that the state legislature had essentially mandated that 
integration be postponed indefinitely, Powell conceded that the 
Richmond schools had not been integrated until ordered to do so by a 
federal court.218 Powell then recounted the dispute over the 
construction of John Marshall High School, observing that, despite 
the public statements that he had made at the time, “it was perfectly 
obvious if we built [the high schools] in the locations recommended 
by the school board, that they would become integrated in a fairly 
short period of time . . . .”219 
Bayh then sought to have Powell express his opinion on the 
practice of busing students for the purpose of achieving racial 
balance.220 Observing that he would undoubtedly be called upon to 
decide cases involving busing, Powell would say only that “busing has 
been used in public education for many years” and that the question 
of whether busing was in the best interest of children and the 
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educational system would have to be decided on a case by case 
basis.221 Similarly, when pressed for his opinion on the constitutional 
issues related to inequalities in school finance, Powell stated simply 
that “it is a problem which worried us a great deal when I was on the 
State board of education primarily because we were more or less 
powerless to deal with it.”222 
Taken as a whole, the committee’s questioning of Powell was 
relatively benign, and nothing in Powell’s answers seemed to pose any 
real threat to his confirmation. However, some members of the civil 
rights community remained alarmed at the prospect of having Powell 
serve on the Court.223 On November 9, Democratic Rep. John 
Conyers, Jr. of Michigan, who spoke on behalf of the Congressional 
Black Caucus, and Henry L. Marsh III, a Richmond attorney who 
represented the all-black Old Dominion Bar Association, appeared 
together before the committee and argued that the nomination should 
be rejected.224 
Conyers and Marsh castigated Powell for his membership in 
segregated private clubs, noted that Powell served on the boards of 
directors of a number of large corporations that had been charged 
with racial discrimination, and asserted that Hunton and Williams, 
which had never hired an African-American attorney, in fact had a 
policy of not considering African-Americans for positions in the 
firm.225 However, their primary focus was on the actions that Powell 
had taken as a member of the Richmond School Board and the 
Virginia State Board of Education.226 Emphasizing the lack of real 
integration of the Richmond public schools during Powell’s tenure, 
Conyers and Marsh contended that Powell’s opposition to massive 
resistance had been based on tactical rather than principled grounds, 
with Conyers declaring that “there were those in Richmond who had 
good cause to be justly proud of the masterful way in which Mr. 
Powell had perpetuated the antiquated notions of white supremacy 
through a clever institutionalization of school segregation”227 and 
Marsh asserting that “Mr. Powell had sense enough to recognize the 
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futility of the massive resistance program and to go for a more 
sophisticated scheme of evading the Brown decision.”228 
However, this assessment was disputed by others who had been 
involved in the struggle over desegregation of the Virginia schools. 
For example, Armistead Boothe, a progressive state legislator who 
had been the public face of the opposition to massive resistance, 
declared that “the regard for law[] and the farsightedness of a few 
people like Lewis Powell . . . helped Virginia . . . to survive the 
Commonwealth’s severest test in this century” and asserted that “if 
the distinguished members of [the Congressional Black Caucus] could 
remember the 1950’s and could get all the available facts . . . [t]hey 
would approve of [Powell’s] selection and thank the good Lord they 
would have him on the Supreme Court.”229 A number of prominent 
African-Americans who had worked with Powell expressed much the 
same view. Thus, Booker T. Bradshaw, the only African-American who 
had been a member the Richmond School Board in the years 
immediately following the decision in Brown, wrote that “[d]uring 
that period I did not observe any evidence of racial prejudice on 
[Powell’s] part. On the contrary, I always found him to be fair, calm, 
and objective in his approach to the many problems that confronted 
us.”230 Similarly, Oliver Hill, the civil rights leader who had spoken at 
the public meeting dealing with the dispute over the Chandler 
conversion, described Powell as “a man whose heart is right.”231 
Such statements of support did much to blunt the force of the 
Conyers/Marsh assault on the Powell nomination. In addition, the fact 
that the Senate had rejected the nominations of Clement Haynsworth 
and Harold Carswell in 1970 provided Powell’s supporters with a 
tactical advantage. In the wake of the Carswell defeat, Richard Nixon 
had asserted bitterly that “it is not possible to get confirmation for the 
judge on the Supreme Court of any man who believes in the strict 
construction of the Constitution . . . if he happens to come from the 
South.”232 Those who had opposed Haynsworth and Carswell had 
vehemently denied this charge, claiming instead that the opposition 
had been focused on the individual characteristics of the nominees.233 
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The Powell nomination put the latter claim to the test. However 
one might have characterized his political views, Powell was plainly an 
extraordinarily competent attorney whose ability and temperament 
had been lavishly praised by pillars of the legal establishment with a 
variety of different intellectual and political perspectives. The 
rejection of such a nominee would in essence have confirmed Nixon’s 
assessment of the Senate’s attitude toward conservative appointments 
from the South. 
In addition, and perhaps most importantly, Powell benefited 
greatly from having his nomination being paired with that of William 
H. Rehnquist. Rehnquist came to the confirmation process with a 
long, documented record of hard-edged support for extremely 
conservative positions.234 Whatever flaws progressives might have 
seen in Powell’s record, and whatever concerns they might have had 
about his nomination, paled in comparison with their alarm at the 
prospect of Rehnquist joining the Court.235 Thus, for example, 
appearing before the Judiciary Committee on behalf of the NAACP 
and the Leadership Council on Civil Rights, Clarence Mitchell and 
Joseph L. Rauh explicitly declined to take any position on the Powell 
nomination, choosing instead to devote their testimony entirely to an 
attack on Rehnquist’s record.236 
Against this background, the comments of Conyers and Marsh 
had no appreciable impact on the confirmation process. Unlike 
Rehnquist, whose confirmation was opposed by four members of the 
Senate Judiciary Committee and twenty-six senators on the floor of 
the Senate, Powell was confirmed almost unanimously.237 Moreover, 
the only senator who cast a negative vote made no reference to 
Powell’s record on civil rights, instead characterizing the nominee as 
“an elitist [who] has never shown any deep feelings for little 
people.”238 Thus, Powell joined the Court on December 7, 1971. 
B. Race-Related Jurisprudence 
During the fifteen years that he served on the Supreme Court, 
Powell was called upon to address a wide variety of race-related 
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problems. Powell’s analysis of these issues often reflected his belief 
that African-Americans and other racial minorities had made great 
progress in the years since Brown had been decided. As already noted, 
as late as 1966, Powell had acknowledged that “the Negro has had, 
until recent years, little reason to respect the law,” that “[t]he entire 
legal process from the police and the sheriff, to the citizens who serve 
on juries has too often applied a double standard of justice.”239 
However, Powell also apparently believed that, by the early 1970s, the 
kind of widespread, systemic racial discrimination that had 
characterized American society in the pre-Brown era was largely a 
thing of the past. While he was willing to concede that individual 
African-Americans and members of other racial minority groups 
might at times be victims of specific acts of racial discrimination, he 
was also firmly convinced that, in most cases, racial minorities could 
expect fair treatment from the institutions of government and from 
society more generally. 
In 1972, this view was clearly reflected in Powell’s reaction to a 
broad-based constitutional challenge to the use of the death penalty 
in Furman v. Georgia.240 Among other things, those who were 
challenging the constitutionality of capital punishment argued that 
the manner in which the death penalty was administered 
discriminated against African-Americans. In responding to this 
argument, Powell expressed a willingness to consider equal protection 
challenges to the imposition of the death penalty in specific cases.241 
But at the same time, asserting that “[t]he segregation of our society 
in decades past, which contributed substantially to the severity of 
punishment for interracial crimes, is now no longer prevalent in this 
country,” he contended that “[t]he possibility of racial bias in the trial 
and sentencing process has diminished in recent years.”242 Similarly, 
declaring that “the day is past when juries do not represent the 
minority group elements of the community,” Powell insisted that 
“[t]he assurance of fair trials for all citizens is greater today than at 
any previous time in our history.”243 Thus, he concluded that “because 
standards of criminal justice have ‘evolved’ in a manner favorable to 
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the accused, discriminatory imposition of capital punishment is far 
less likely today than in the past.”244 
Fifteen years later, in an intraoffice memorandum in McCleskey v. 
Kemp,245 Powell reiterated this view even in the face of a statistical 
study that concluded that racial issues played a significant role in 
determining whether the death penalty was imposed in capital cases. 
In the memorandum, noting that in 1976 the Court had imposed new 
procedural constraints on the imposition of the death penalty, Powell 
observed that “the argument that capital punishment is imposed on a 
racially discriminatory basis could well have been made in cases 
decided under standardless capital punishment statutes such as those 
considered in Furman v. Georgia.”246 But at the same time, he also 
asserted that “I . . . think . . . the framework approved by the Court in 
[1976] . . . is constitutionally sufficient to prevent racial 
discrimination.”247 In addition, maintaining that “it is the jury that is a 
criminal defendant’s fundamental ‘protection of life and liberty 
against race or color prejudice’,”248 Powell’s published opinion 
asserted that “McCleskey’s argument that the Constitution condemns 
the discretion allowed decisionmakers in the Georgia capital 
sentencing system is antithetical to the fundamental role of discretion 
in our criminal justice system.”249 Thus, Powell ultimately found that 
“the [statistical] study does not demonstrate a constitutionally 
significant risk of racial bias affecting the Georgia capital sentencing 
process.”250 
In McCleskey, Powell spoke for the Court in concluding that the 
Georgia procedure did not run afoul of constitutional norms. 
Similarly, in cases such as Regents of the University of California v. 
Bakke,251 Powell generally held the deciding vote in evaluating the 
legality of race-conscious affirmative action programs. By contrast, 
when dealing with issues related to school desegregation remedies 
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and voting rights, Powell was often unsuccessful in convincing a 
majority of his colleagues to accept his views. 
In the school desegregation cases, Powell often focused on what 
he viewed as the impropriety of remedial orders that mandated the 
busing of large numbers of students for the purpose of improving 
racial balance in the public schools. Such orders had proliferated in 
the wake of the decision in Swann, where the Court had unanimously 
rejected Powell’s argument and held that, in a situation where an 
urban school system had previously been segregated by law, an order 
which mandated the transportation of a substantial number of 
students was entirely appropriate.252 Throughout his tenure as a 
justice, Powell sought to narrow the scope of this principle. 
In this context, Powell’s opinions reiterated his commitment to the 
principle of neighborhood schools and his conviction that the 
aggressive pursuit of racial balance should often be subordinated to 
this concept. Thus, in 1973, echoing his brief in Swann, Powell’s 
opinion in Keyes v. School District No. 1253 asserted that 
“[n]eighborhood school systems, neutrally administered, reflect the 
deeply felt desire of citizens for a sense of community in their public 
education”254 and observed that “[c]ommunity support, interest, and 
dedication to public schools may well run higher with a neighborhood 
attendance pattern: distance may encourage disinterest.”255 Seven 
years later, his opinion in Estes v. Metropolitan Branches of Dallas 
NAACP256 was, if anything, even more critical of busing orders, 
insisting that “it is increasingly evident that use of the busing remedy 
to achieve racial balance can conflict with the goals of equal 
educational opportunity and quality schools” and that “[i]n all too 
many cities, well-intentioned court decrees have had the primary 
effect of stimulating resegregation.”257 
Despite such pleas, a majority of the justices who served with 
Powell on the Burger Court continued to support the use of busing 
orders in a wide variety of circumstances.258 In Milliken v. Bradley,259 
 
 252.  Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
 253.  413 U.S. 189 (1973). 
 254.  Id. at 246 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 255.  Id. 
 256.  444 U.S. 437 (1980). 
 257.  Id. at 438 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 258.  See, e.g., Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979); Columbus Bd. of 
Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979). 
 259.  418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
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four of his colleagues did join Powell in concluding that, in the 
absence of a showing of an “inter-district violation,” remedial orders 
could not require the transportation of students across district lines. 
Subject to this limitation, however, at the time that Powell left the 
Court in 1987, many urban school districts throughout the country 
remained subject to the requirement that students be transported 
substantial distances in order to improve the racial balance in public 
schools.260 
Powell was no less disturbed by the continuing application of the 
preclearance requirement of section five of the Voting Rights Act to 
the Southern states. In 1973, his displeasure was clearly expressed 
during the consideration of Georgia v. United States.261 Georgia did 
not come to the Court as a constitutional challenge. Instead, since 
South Carolina v. Katzenbach and its progeny had apparently settled 
the constitutional issue, the state contended simply that it should 
prevail on statutory grounds. However, while almost all of Powell’s 
brief published dissent ultimately focused on the statutory issue in 
Georgia,262 during the consideration of the case he also challenged the 
constitutionality of the preclearance requirement itself.263 
In a memorandum to Justice Potter Stewart, Powell insisted that 
he would have had no objection to what he described as “a carefully 
drawn Voting Rights Act which applied uniformly to all fifty states.”264 
Indeed, Powell’s opinion in Georgia asserted that Congress was under 
a positive duty to pass legislation that would protect the rights 
guaranteed by the Fifteenth Amendment.265 Nonetheless, Powell was 
convinced that section five itself was unconstitutional. 
Unlike Powell’s assessment of the role that racial issues played in 
the imposition of the death penalty, his criticism of the preclearance 
requirement does not appear to have rested on the premise that 
substantial progress in race relations had been made in the post-
Brown era. Instead, he apparently took the position that the 
preclearance requirement had been unconstitutional at the time that 
it was enacted in 1965. In his memorandum to Stewart, Powell 
 
 260.  See, e.g., Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979). 
 261.  411 U.S. 526 (1973). 
 262.  Id. at 545 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 263.  See infra note 272 and accompanying text. 
 264.  Memorandum from LFP to Potter Stewart, March 30, 1973, Case File Georgia v. 
United States, No. 72-75, Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Box 166, Folder 3 (on file, Library of 
Congress). 
 265.  Georgia, 411 U.S. at 545 (1973) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
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complained that the preclearance mandate required states “to go hat 
in hand [to] obtain the consent of the Attorney General or run the 
gauntlet of the [federal district court for the District of Columbia] 
before an act of the state legislature may go into effect.”266 Moreover, 
Powell believed that the constitutional problems inherent in section 
five had been magnified by decisions such as Matthews, and, 
reiterating the view that he had expressed in his 1971 memorandum 
on the Chesterfield annexation, complained to Stewart that the 
application of the Voting Rights Act to annexation decisions “does 
grievous harm to the orderly development of urban communities.”267 
Powell was also extremely displeased by the fact that a handful of 
Southern states had been singled out for unfavorable treatment by 
section five. Powell conceded that, historically, African-Americans 
who sought to vote in the South had often faced greater difficulties 
than their counterparts in other areas of the country.268 Thus, an early 
draft of his opinion in Georgia explicitly acknowledged the fact that 
“various means, both overt and subtle, have been employed to deny 
voting rights on racial grounds, and these indefensible practices have 
been more prevalent in some states and sections of our country than 
in others.”269 But the same unpublished draft also observed that, as 
interpreted by cases such as Allen and Perkins, “section 5 . . . appl[ies] 
to conduct which is common to all of the states” and that “these 
commonplace changes, often essential to meet neutral and nonracial 
needs, are not unique to the few states targeted by this discriminatory 
legislation. They are as national in usage as state and local 
government itself.”270 In short, as he observed in the memorandum to 
Stewart, Powell viewed section five as “discriminatory and 
indefensible sectional rather than national legislation.”271 
Ultimately, Powell decided against using Georgia as a vehicle to 
make a detailed argument against the constitutionality of the 
preclearance requirement. Instead, in his published opinion, he 
contented himself with the simple observation that “[i]t is indeed a 
serious intrusion, incompatible with the basic structure of our system, 
for federal authorities to compel a State to submit its legislation for 
 
 266.  Mar. 30 Memorandum from LFP to Potter Stewart, supra note 264. 
 267.  Id. 
 268.  Draft opinion, April 2, 1973, LFP Case Files, Georgia v. United States, No. 72-75, at 3 
(archived online at http://law2.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1602). 
 269.  Id. at 5. 
 270.  Id. 
 271.  Mar. 30 Memorandum from LFP to Potter Stewart, supra note 264. 
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advance review” and the assertion that this requirement was 
“rendered the more noxious by its selective application to only a few 
States.”272 However, seven years later, after Congress had voted in 
1975 to once again extend the life of the preclearance requirement, 
Powell publicly assailed the constitutionality of the application of 
section five to a Southern municipality in City of Rome v. United 
States.273 
City of Rome came to the Court after the municipal government 
of the city of Rome, Georgia, had unsuccessfully sought preclearance 
for a number of annexations and changes in the manner that its City 
Commission and Board of Education were chosen. Following the 
denial of the preclearance request, the city sought to take advantage 
of the so-called “bailout” procedure that had been incorporated into 
the Voting Rights Act. By its terms, the bailout provision provided 
that a covered “State” could be relieved of the preclearance mandate 
if the state could demonstrate that no test or other device had been 
used in the jurisdiction within the past seventeen years “for the 
purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on 
account of race or color.”274 The city argued that it was entitled to 
avail itself of the bailout provision because the city itself had not 
engaged in any discriminatory practices for the requisite period, 
notwithstanding the fact that the state of Georgia as a whole had not 
satisfied the requirements established by the statute. In addition to its 
statutory arguments, the city government also contended that in this 
context, Congress could not constitutionally require the city to obtain 
preclearance before taking the proposed actions. 
Speaking for the Court, Thurgood Marshall showed no sympathy 
for these arguments. In rejecting the constitutional challenge, the 
majority opinion emphasized the long history of racial discrimination 
in the South, noting that, in 1965—a full ninety-five years after the 
ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment—Congress had determined 
that “racial discrimination in voting was an ‘insidious and pervasive 
evil which had been perpetuated in certain parts of our country 
through unremitting and ingenious defiance of the Constitution’”275 
 
 272.  Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 545 (Powell, J., dissenting) (emphasis in 
original). 
 273.  446 U.S. 156 (1980). 
 274.  42 U.S.C. sec. 1973b(a) 
 275.  Georgia v. United , 411 U.S. at 181–82 (emphasis in original) (quoting South Carolina 
v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 309 (1966)). 
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and asserting that “in adopting the Voting Rights Act, Congress 
sought to remedy this century of obstruction by shifting ‘the 
advantage of time and inertia from the perpetrators of the evil to its 
victims.’”276 Turning specifically to the decision to extend the 
preclearance requirement in 1975, Marshall noted that “[t]en years 
later, Congress found that a 7-year extension of the Act was necessary 
to preserve the ‘limited and fragile’ achievements of the Act and to 
promote further amelioration of voting discrimination”277 and 
concluded that “[w]hen viewed in this light, Congress’ considered 
determination that at least another 7 years of statutory remedies were 
necessary to counter the perpetuation of 95 years of pervasive voting 
discrimination is both unsurprising and unassailable.”278 
Not surprisingly, Powell viewed the extension of the preclearance 
requirement quite differently. In the interim between Georgia and 
City of Rome, Powell had reluctantly concurred in a number of 
expansive interpretations of the preclearance requirement, reasoning 
that the results were compelled by the logic of decisions such as 
Perkins.279 However, he was unwilling to countenance the imposition 
of the preclearance requirement in City of Rome, fuming privately 
that “this intrusion on the right of cities & states to determine their 
own local gov’t structure . . . is indefensible as applied only to selected 
states and now has continued long after blacks vote freely throughout 
the South,”280 and expressing the belief that African-Americans would 
be able to use their newly-acquired political power to prevent state 
officials from instituting racially-discriminatory measures.281 
Moreover, to Powell, the specific facts of City of Rome provided a 
classic example of what he characterized as the “absurdities” of 
section five. Among other things, the Attorney General had refused to 
preclear thirteen proposed annexations. Nine of the thirteen cases 
involved vacant land, while taken together the remaining annexations 
would have resulted in a net decline of a total of one percent in the 
African-American share of the electorate in Rome. Against this 
 
 276.  Id. at 182 (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328 (1966)). 
 277.  Id. 
 278.  Id. 
 279.  See, e.g., United States v. Bd. of Comm’rs. of Sheffield, 435 U.S. 110, 139–40 (Powell, 
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 280.  Handwritten Notes on Memorandum from David to LFP, September 17, 1979, LFP 
Case File, City of Rome v. United States, no. 78-7840 at 1 online at https://scholarlycommons.law 
.wlu.edu/casefiles/259/, (last visited April 23, 2019). 
 281.  Id. at 6. 
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background, Powell argued not only that the Voting Rights Act by its 
terms allowed the city of Rome to be considered independently for 
purposes of the bailout provision, but also that it had been 
unconstitutional for the district court to refuse to allow the city to 
take advantage of that provision. 
Powell began his dissenting opinion in City of Rome by observing 
that even the majority in South Carolina v. Katzenbach had 
recognized that the preclearance provision was “an uncommon 
exercise of congressional power.” He argued that section five was 
“especially troubling because it destroys local control of the means of 
self-government,”282 which Powell described as “one of the central 
values of our polity.”283 Nonetheless, Powell’s City of Rome dissent did 
not explicitly address the broader question of whether Congress had 
exceeded its constitutional authority by extending the life of the 
preclearance requirement in 1975. Instead, he focused specifically on 
the situation in which local governments found themselves in states 
such as Georgia. 
Powell asserted that “[u]nless the federal structure provides some 
protection for a community’s ordering of its own democratic 
procedures, the right of each community to determine its own course 
within the boundaries marked by the Constitution is at risk.”284 
Observing that only the need to remedy violations of the Fifteenth 
Amendment justified the preclearance requirement’s intrusion on the 
right to self-government, Powell contended that any such broad based 
requirement ran the risk of burdening jurisdictions that had not in 
fact been guilty of racial discrimination and insisted that only the 
existence of a bailout procedure made this possibility tolerable.285 He 
also noted that a regime that made the procedure available only when 
an entire state could demonstrate that it had been free from racially 
discriminatory voting practices for seventeen years in essence “makes 
every city and county in Georgia a hostage to the errors, or even the 
deliberate intransigence, of a single subdivision.” Against this 
background, Powell concluded that the preclearance requirement 
could pass constitutional muster only if individual subdivisions were 
 
 282.  City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 201 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 283.  Id. 
 284.  Id. at 201–02. 
 285.  Id. at 202–03. 
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entitled to avail themselves of the bailout procedure based solely on 
local conditions.286 
In one important respect, Powell’s proposed treatment of section 
five differed radically from the courses of action that he championed 
in cases such as McCleskey and Keyes. In McCleskey and Keyes, 
Powell advocated judicial restraint. By contrast, in Georgia and City of 
Rome, he took the position that the Court should act aggressively to 
rein in legislative action that threatened what Powell viewed as 
fundamental precepts of the American political system. Nonetheless, 
his opinions in all of these cases are connected by a common theme: 
the view that systemic problems of racism had largely disappeared, 
and that any remaining issues should be addressed in a manner that 
did not unduly disrupt existing institutional structures. 
However, Powell had only limited success in convincing a majority 
of his colleagues to embrace this perspective. As already noted, when 
Powell left the Court in 1987, many jurisdictions remained subject to 
judicial decrees requiring widespread transportation of students in 
order to improve the racial balance of public schools. Moreover, the 
Court’s failure to condemn the preclearance requirement had left 
Powell’s native Virginia and a number of other Southern states 
subject to the strictures of section five of the Voting Rights Act. Thus, 
Powell could not have been satisfied with the state of the law dealing 
with these issues at the time that he left the Court. By contrast, he 
would have been more pleased with the evolution of the doctrines 
relating to both school desegregation and the Voting Rights Act 
during the period between the time of his retirement and the present 
day. 
IV. THE TRIUMPH OF THE SOUTHERN MAN 
A. School Desegregation 
The Court’s approach to the issues of remedies in school 
desegregation cases began to change soon after Powell was replaced 
by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy in 1987. The pivotal moment came in 
1991 with the decision in Oklahoma City Board of Education v. 
Dowell.287 Dowell arose from the efforts of the Oklahoma City Board 
of Education to free itself from the constraints of a desegregation 
 
 286.  See id. at 203. 
 287.  498 U.S. 237 (1991). 
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injunction that had been issued by a federal district court in 1972. 
Under the terms of that injunction, the Board of Education was 
required to follow the terms of the so-called “Finger Plan,” which 
required the transportation of large numbers of students in order to 
improve racial balance in the public elementary and secondary 
schools in Oklahoma City. After following the dictates of the Finger 
Plan for more than a decade, the Board of Education argued that the 
school system had achieved unitary status, and that the board should 
be allowed to implement the terms of a Student Reassignment Plan 
[hereinafter SRP] under which the Finger Plan would continue to 
govern the assignment of students in middle school and high school, 
but elementary school students would be assigned to their 
neighborhood schools. 
Because of residential segregation, adherence to the SRP was 
certain to dramatically reduce the degree of racial balance in the 
Oklahoma City schools. Under the terms of the plan, of the sixty-four 
elementary schools in the system, eleven would be over ninety 
percent African-American, while the student population of twenty-
two schools would be less than ten percent African-American. 
Nonetheless, the district court concluded that the Board of Education 
should be allowed to implement the SRP, finding that the Oklahoma 
City school district had achieved unitary status by faithfully 
complying with the terms of the 1972 order, that the SRP had not 
been intentionally designed to increase racial segregation, and that 
the 1972 injunction should be dissolved. However, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the 1972 
injunction should remain in place absent “dramatic changes in 
conditions unforeseen at the time of the decree that . . . impose 
extreme and unexpectedly oppressive hardships on the [Board of 
Education]” and that Oklahoma City remained under an obligation 
“not to take any action that would impede the process of disestablishing 
the dual system and its effects.”288 
When Dowell came before the Supreme Court, a majority of the 
justices concluded that the judgment of the court of appeals should be 
reversed. Speaking for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist asserted 
that “[t]he test espoused by the Court of Appeals would condemn a 
school district, once governed by a board which intentionally 
discriminated, to judicial tutelage for the indefinite future” and 
 
 288.  Id. at 244 (quoting Dayton Bd. Of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 538 (1979)). 
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declared that “[n]either the principles governing the entry and 
dissolution of injunctive decrees, nor the commands of the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, require any such 
Draconian result.”289 While conceding that “a district court need not 
accept at face value the profession of a school board which has 
intentionally discriminated that it will cease to do so in the future,” 
Rehnquist also observed that “in deciding whether to modify or 
dissolve a desegregation decree, a school board’s compliance with 
previous court orders is obviously relevant,” noting that “the . . . 
passage of time [between the time that the original decree was 
entered and 1985] enables the district court to observe the good faith 
of the school board in complying with the decree.”290 
Rehnquist did not explicitly reinstate the judgment dissolving the 
1972 injunction. Instead, he concluded that the district court should be 
instructed to determine whether the school board had made a 
“sufficient showing of constitutional compliance” to allow judicial 
supervision to be terminated and also whether the decision to adopt 
the SRP had in fact been tainted by racial considerations.291 
Nonetheless, the majority opinion in Dowell clearly implied that, once 
a school board had faithfully observed the terms of a desegregation 
decree for a significant period of time, the board should be freed from 
the supervision of the federal courts, subject only to the proviso that 
race should not play a role in determining the policies adopted to 
govern educational affairs. 
Any doubts that might have remained regarding the change in the 
Court’s attitude toward desegregation orders were dispelled the 
following year by the decision in Freeman v. Pitts.292 Freeman involved 
a dispute over the status of the school system in Dekalb County, 
Georgia, which had been subject to federal court supervision since 
1969 under a consent decree that required the local authorities to 
replace the segregated system that had formerly been maintained in 
Dekalb County with an approach designed to create a unitary system. 
In 1986, in response to a petition to dissolve the consent decree, the 
district court found that, while the school system had not achieved 
unitary status in all respects, with respect to student assignments the 
school system had been “effectively desegregated” for a period of 
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time,293 and that subsequent changes in racial balance were the result 
of demographic changes for which the school authorities bore no 
responsibility.294 
Against this background, the Freeman Court held that “federal 
courts have the authority to relinquish supervision and control of 
school districts in incremental stages, before full compliance has been 
achieved in every area of school operations”295 and in particular that 
“the district court may determine that it will not order further 
remedies in the area of student assignments where racial imbalance is 
not traceable, in a proximate way, to constitutional violations.”296 
Focusing on a theme that had often been emphasized by Justice 
Powell, the opinion of the Court declared that “[r]eturning schools to 
the control of local authorities at the earliest practicable date is 
essential to restore their true accountability in our governmental 
system”297 and that “[w]hen the school district and all state entities 
participating with it in operating the schools make decisions in the 
absence of judicial supervision, they can be held accountable to the 
citizenry, to the political process, and to the courts in the ordinary 
course.”298 
By setting the stage for the end of judicial decrees mandating 
widespread transportation of children for the purpose of achieving 
racial balance, Dowell and Freeman in effect embraced the 
perspective that had been taken by Justice Powell throughout his 
career on the Court. Within two decades, over half of all the school 
districts that had been subject to court-ordered desegregation plans 
had been released from judicial supervision, in many cases paving the 
way for a return to the kind of neighborhood-based school 
assignment policies that Powell had so vigorously championed.299 
Thus, the era of extensive court-ordered school busing had effectively 
come to an end. 
 
 293.  Id. at 477. 
 294.  Id. at 494. 
 295.  Id. at 490. 
 296.  Id. at 491. 
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 298.  Id. 
 299.  Sean F. Reardon, Elena Tej Grewal, Demetra Kalogrides & Erica Greenberg, 
“Brown” Fades: The End of Court-Ordered School Desegregation and the Resegregation of 
American Public Schools, 31 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 876, 877 (2012). 
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B. The Death of the Preclearance Requirement 
Powell would have been equally pleased by the ultimate demise of 
the preclearance requirement of the Voting Rights Act. After he left 
the Court in 1987, the preclearance requirement was reauthorized for 
fifteen years in 1992 and for an additional twenty-five years in 2006. 
The 2006 Reauthorization Act also overruled two Supreme Court 
decisions that had made it easier for covered jurisdictions to obtain 
preclearance for changes in election procedures.300 
Despite these reaffirmations by Congress, the concept of 
preclearance continued to be the subject of constitutional challenges 
in the late twentieth century.301 However, it was not until 2009 that a 
majority of the justices first indicated that they had serious doubts 
about the constitutionality of the 2006 extension.302 While the Court 
did not definitively resolve the constitutional issue at that time, four 
years later, the five most conservative members of the Court explicitly 
concluded that the extension was unconstitutional in Shelby County v. 
Holder.303 
Speaking for the majority, Chief Justice John Roberts reiterated 
the standard characterization of the preclearance requirement as 
“‘extraordinary legislation otherwise unfamiliar to our federal 
system’”304 that constituted an “‘extraordinary departure from the 
traditional course of relations between the States and the Federal 
Government’.”305 In addition, he contended that the decision to 
impose the requirement on some but not all state governments ran 
afoul of the principle that “all the States enjoy equal sovereignty”306 
and that any departure from this principle required a showing that the 
disparate treatment of the states was “sufficiently related to the 
problem that it targets.”307 
 
 300.  The two decisions were Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003), which held that a 
plan could be precleared even if it reduced minority voters’ ability to elect their preferred 
representatives, as long as it preserved the “opportunity to participate in the political process,” 
and Reno v. Bossier Parrish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320 (2000), which held that section five barred 
preclearance only for changes that were designed to worsen the existing position of minority 
voters. 
 301.  See, e.g., Lopez v. Monterey Cty., 525 U.S. 266 (1999). 
 302.  Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009). 
 303.  570 U.S. 529 (2013). 
 304.  Id. at 545 (quoting Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 211). 
 305.  Id. (quoting Presley v. Etowah Cty. Comm’n, 502 U.S. 491, 500–501 (1992)). 
 306.  Id. 
 307.  Id. at 542 (quoting Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 203). 
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Roberts conceded that in 1965, both the imposition of the 
preclearance requirement itself and the content of the formula that 
determined which jurisdictions would be subject to the requirement 
were justified by the conditions which existed at the time.308 At the 
same time, however, the opinion also cited a variety of evidence that 
in Roberts’s view demonstrated that African-Americans in the 
Southern states had far greater opportunity to participate in the 
political process than the statistics from the 1960s and 1970s would 
suggest.309 Thus, insisting that the 2006 extension “imposes current 
burdens and must be justified by current needs,”310 Roberts concluded 
that the original coverage formula could no longer be used to identify 
the states that would be required to preclear changes in the electoral 
process, and that, in the absence of the adoption of a formula that 
more accurately reflected the realities of the early twenty-first 
century, Congress could not constitutionally subject a small group of 
states to the preclearance requirement. 
The majority opinion in Shelby County thus embraced two of the 
most important aspects of Justice Powell’s worldview. First, the 
decision was based on the theory that the Southern states were being 
unfairly singled out for less favorable treatment that was not justified 
by empirical evidence. In addition, Chief Justice Roberts seems to 
have shared Powell’s conviction that racism was no longer endemic in 
the United States and that specific instances of racial discrimination 
could be adequately addressed without unduly disrupting the 
traditional structure of governmental institutions. The majority 
opinion acknowledged that, at the time that the Voting Rights Act was 
passed in 1965, the preclearance requirement had been imposed on 
the Southern states because Congress had determined that “[c]ase-by-
case litigation had proved inadequate to prevent . . . racial 
discrimination in voting [in those states].”311 Roberts also conceded 
that “voting discrimination still exists”312 and declared that “any racial 
discrimination in voting is too much.”313 But at the same time, he 
insisted that “our Nation has made great strides [in providing African-
Americans with access to political power]”314 and, by invalidating 
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section five, implicitly suggested that the standard modes of judicial 
action could provide a sufficient remedy for any further instances of 
racial discrimination in the political process. In short, much like 
Powell before him, Roberts chose to emphasize the progress that had 
been made in race relations rather than the challenges that remained 
to be addressed. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Although Lewis Powell would no doubt have been greatly pleased 
by the tenor of the majority opinion in Shelby County, the opinion did 
not completely vindicate Powell’s view of the state of race relations at 
the time that he joined the Court. In effectively striking down the 
preclearance provision of the Voting Rights Act, Chief Justice Roberts 
focused on the political power available to African-Americans in the 
early twenty-first century—a power that was on display, for example, 
in recent statewide elections in Virginia and Alabama, where the 
African-American vote played a crucial role by providing the margin 
of victory for Democratic candidates whose opponents received a 
substantial majority of white votes.315 However, the situation in the 
South was very different in the late 1960s and early 1970s, when 
Powell often asserted that systemic racial discrimination was already a 
thing of the past and bitterly described section five as “discriminatory 
and indefensible sectional rather than national legislation” that “does 
grievous harm to the orderly development of urban communities [in 
the South].”316 
Nonetheless, even if one accepts Roberts’ assessment of the 
current situation with respect to voting rights, the ongoing impact of 
systemic racial discrimination continues to be apparent in other 
contexts in which Powell expressed confidence in the ability of 
existing institutions to treat African-Americans fairly. For example, 
although white students are now significantly less likely to attend 
highly segregated schools than in the years before Dowell, the period 
between 1988 and 2013 witnessed a steady rise in the percentage of 
students of color who attend public schools that have few white 
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polls/?utm_term=.fea4e293a735 (last visited Mar. 31, 2019) (detailing Virginia voting polls); 
Summer Meza, Who Voted For Doug Jones? White Women Backed Roy Moore, NEWSWEEK, 
http://www.newsweek.com/doug-jones-roy-moore-alabama-senate-race-special-election-results-
demographics-746366 (last visited Mar. 31, 2019) (detailing Alabama voting polls). 
 316.  March 30 Memorandum from LFP to Potter Stewart, supra note 264.  
MALTZ_MACROS (DO NOT DELETE) 5/15/2019  10:28 PM 
232 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 14 
students,317 despite research suggesting that children of color are more 
likely to succeed academically in racially-integrated settings.318 
Similarly, people of color remain far more likely than whites to be 
subjected to capital punishment,319 and the race of the victim 
continues to be a significant factor in determining whether a 
particular defendant is sentenced to die for a crime.320 
Of course, the fact that such problems continue to exist does not 
by its terms determine the appropriate role of the judiciary in dealing 
with these issues. One might, for example, take the view that the 
underperformance by children of color in urban schools is best 
addressed through measures designed to improve the quality of those 
schools rather than the transportation of the students to schools that 
are outside of their neighborhoods. But no one can plausibly suggest, 
as Lewis Powell did more than forty years ago, that widespread 
segregation and racial inequality are no longer problems in the 
United States, and the analysis of constitutional issues should reflect 
this reality. 
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 318.  Ethnic and Racial Disparities in Education: Psychology’s Contributions to 
Understanding and Reducing Disparities, AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, 58–61 
(2012), https://www.scribd.com/document/142923734/Ethnic-and-Racial-Disparities-in-
Education (last visited Mar. 31, 2019).  
 319.  Race and the Death Penalty, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, 
https://www.aclu.org/other/race-and-death-penalty (last visited Mar. 31, 2019).   
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